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INTRODUCTION

Two of the most basic concerns of the criminal justice system are the
integrity of the fact-finding, truth-determining process and the sanctity of
acquittals, the judicial declaration of innocence. On one hand, the object of
a criminal trial is the search for truth. Protection of individual interests in
particular cases, as well as systematic and societal interests in the punishment and prevention of crime and in the viability of the system itself, depend upon the actual and perceived achievement of this object. Perjured
testimony by witnesses and criminal defendants undermines this process
and threatens to destroy these interests. On the other hand, a fundamental
value judgment of the criminal justice system is that it is better that a guilty
person go free than for an innocent person to be convicted and punished for
a crime he or she did not commit. Because of this overriding concern for
the protection of innocence, judgments of acquittal are final even if errone* Associate Professor of Law and Assistant Dean of Student Affairs, Temple University
School of Law. The author expresses his thanks to Temple University School of Law for its
financial and secretarial help; to Dean James Strazzella for his constant support, ideas, and insight; to Professor Rob Bartow for his organizational and editorial assistance; and to Frances
McGinley for the hours of research, reading, and feedback.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:703

ous. The government is not allowed a second chance to prove guilt after
previously failing to establish it.
When a criminal defendant is thought to have procured an acquittal by
perjured testimony, these fundamental interests clash. How can we protect
our concern for the truth-determining process and the evils of false testimony by prosecuting the perjurer, while at the same time protecting the
fundamental interests in safeguarding the declaration of his or her innocence? This article is directed to that question; the answer ultimately turns
on how best to balance the seemingly irreconcilable interests involved.
To set the stage for analysis of how courts have dealt with this question
and how the principles involved might better be reconciled, the first part of
this article discusses the competing interests. This initial section summarizes what many perceive to be the perjury problem. The evil consequences
of perjured testimony by criminal defendants are presented, including the
traditional trial process safeguards against false testimony and the reasons
why the crime of perjury is rarely prosecuted, thereby adding to the problem of perjury by failing to discourage false testimony. This section is followed by a general discussion of the constitutional obstacles to prosecuting
defendants who have been acquitted - the basic protections provided by
the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment and the underlying
double jeopardy interests. Next, the collateral estoppel doctrine is introduced by a discussion of Ashe v. Swenson,' in which the United States
Supreme Court incorporated collateral estoppel into the constitutional
double jeopardy guarantee. The Ashe Court's reasoning and its collateral
estoppel principles are set forth.
Within this basic framework, the article turns to an analysis of the effectiveness of the constitutional double jeopardy principles in balancing the
anti-perjury objective with the desire to protect the innocent. Differences in
the standards and approaches articulated and applied by post-Ashe cases,
and the extent to which the Ashe Court's mandates have been followed are
discussed. Additionally, the continued impact of the numerous pre-Ashe
perjury after acquittal cases is analyzed. This section also suggests that the
courts could better deal with perjury after acquittal cases under collateral
estoppel by clearly and consistently articulating and applying principles
that: (1) a perjury prosecution is barred when the issues in fhat prosecution
were necessarily determined by, and determinative of, the earlier acquittal
i.e., when the issues were actually litigated and determined by the original
fact-finder and that determination was essential to the judgment of acquittal; (2) this standard for preclusion should not only be limited to so-called
1. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
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"ultimate issues" of essential elements of the earlier offense, but should also
apply to issues of "evidentiary fact" that the jury must have determined in
order to decide the "ultimate issues"; (3) similarly, the focus should not
narrowly concentrate on the truthfulness of the defendant's testimony, the
"ultimate issue" in the perjury prosecution, but should broadly and realistically concentrate on the underlying fact issues that the testimony addressed
directly or by necessary implication; and (4) acquittals should preclude perjury prosecutions involving only some of the issues determined, even
though any of the determinations alone would have supported the acquittal.
The final section of the article analyzes possible alternatives to the Ashe
collateral estoppel approach. Among the alternatives considered are those
already used in a few states that absolutely bar perjury prosecutions after an
acquittal or conviction when the subject of the alleged perjury is the defendant's general denial of guilt. In addition, the article discusses the possibility
of eschewing collateral estoppel analysis, by overruling Ashe's constitutional
mandate altogether, or establishing an exception to collateral estoppel for
judgments procured by the defendant's fraudulent testimony. Finally, a
narrow rule that would permit perjury prosecutions under a fraud analysis
is suggested, not in place of collateral estoppel, but as an exception which
would leave collateral estoppel as the primary approach to perjury after
acquittal cases but would provide some opportunity for a later prosecution
that otherwise would be barred. This combination of collateral estoppel
with a fraud exception seems to best balance the competing interests of
preventing false testimony by criminal defendants and of protecting judicial
declarations of innocence.
II.

THE PERJURY PROBLEM: FEW PROSECUTIONS DESPITE DRASTIC
CONSEQUENCES OF FALSE TESTIMONY

The extent to which false testimony is given at criminal trials is unknown and unknowable. Knowledgeable observers think it is widespread.'
The consequences of this phenomenon are clear. As former Chief Justice
Burger recently stated, "[p]erjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant af-

2. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 comments at 94-95 (1980); Frankel, The Searchfor
Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1037 (1975); Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S.
CAL. L. REV. 809, 813 n.13 (1977); Comment, Perjury: The Forgotten Offense, 65 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 361, 368 nn.1-2 (1974) [hereinafter Forgotten Offense]; Note, CriminalLaw: Perjury in Kansas, 13 WASHBURN L.J. 479 nn.1-4 (1974) [hereinafter Perjury in Kansas]; Note, Perjury by Defendants: The Uses of Double Jeopardy and CollateralEstoppel, 74 HARV. L. REv. 752
and n.1 (1961) [hereinafter Perjury by Defendants].
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front to the basic concepts of judicial proceedings.", 3 It threatens the fair
and effective administration of justice and the integrity of the courts.
Trials are ideally a search for the truth.' This truth-determining process
depends upon the partisan, but accurate, presentation of truthful evidence
by the parties.' Thus, the United States Supreme Court has aptly observed
that "[a]ll perjured relevant testimony is at war with justice, since it may
produce a judgment not resting on truth. Therefore, it cannot be denied
that it tends to defeat the sole ultimate objective of a trial."7
In criminal cases, false testimony by police and other prosecution witnesses can and does cause unjust convictions of innocent people and the
unjustified loss of life, liberty, and property. 8 This is obviously a serious
matter. The focus here, however, is on defendant perjury. False testimony
by criminal defendants and defense witnesses, if undetected, may lead to
acquittals of the guilty who ought to be punished, restrained, and if possible, rehabilitated. The perception that the guilty are freed because of perjured testimony also undermines the deterrence of future crime.
On a more pervasive level, false testimony undermines the criminal justice system itself. The viability of the system depends on public acceptance
and respect, and the stability of the courts rests on public approval.9 They
depend, in turn, on public confidence in the integrity of the system and on
the perception that the system produces accurate, just results. 10 If inaccurate or unjust results based on false testimony are believed to be the norm,
people will avoid the system altogether. Instead, they will resort to their
own means of resolving disputes, or they will simply resort to their own
false testimony," with increasingly dire consequences. 2

3. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976), as discussed infra notes 136-37.
4. See, e.g., R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 512 n.18 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter
PERKINS & BoYcE]; Gershman, The "PeruryTrap", 129 U. PA. L. REv. 624, 636 (1981); Wolfram, supra note 2, at 808; Forgotten Offense, supra note 2, at 371-72.
5. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that a criminal defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was not violated when his attorney refused to help
him give perjured testimony); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966);
Morgan, HearsayDangersandthe Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 184
(1948). But see Freedman, Judge Frankel'sSearch for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060 (1975).
6. See, eg., Wolfram, supra note 2, at 833-34; Forgotten Offense, supra note 2, at 364.
7. In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945), quoted in Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 185
(1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens).
8. As a result, the prosecution's knowing use of perjured testimony is a denial of due process
entitling the defendant to a new trial if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony
could have affected the jury's judgment. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
9. See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 2, at 833 n.91.
10. Id. at 833.
11. Forgotten Offense, supra note 2, at 364.
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Several aspects of the trial process are designed to safeguard against
false testimony by detecting the falsity or by deterring it through fear of
detection. 3 Thus, one of the fact-finder's main functions is to determine
the credibility of witnesses and the truthfulness of their testimony, based on
a myriad of factors and, in jury trials, guided by proper instructions. 4 The
system assumes that the fact-finder can and will accurately determine the
truthfulness of testimony. This assumption is based on the ability of the
parties to present impeachment evidence and to expose doubts, questions,
and outright falsehoods through cross-examination. Indeed, many, including the United States Supreme Court, believe that cross-examination is the
5
foremost weapon against false testimony',

Certainly these trial safeguards are often effective. Nevertheless, a crim16
inal defendant obviously has a strong motivation to present false evidence.
12. False testimony is also considered a direct and personal affront to the dignity of the court,
akin to contempt of court, on the theory that the courts are entitled to hear only the truth; false
testimony subjects the court to disrespect. See Wolfram, supra note 2, at 834.
13. See, eg., Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 359-60 (1973) ("[p]revention [of perjury] is better than cure: and the law of England relies, for this purpose, on the means provided for
detecting and exposing the crime at the moment of commission,-such as publicity, cross-examination, the aid of a jury, etc ...

" (quoting W. Best, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

§ 606 (C. Chamberlayne ed. 1883))); see also Frankel, supra note 2, at 1039; Wolfram, supra note
2, at 834.
The oath itself is designed to deter false testimony, but it is an effective deterrent only to the
extent that the defendant is concerned about the spiritual immorality of lying and fears supernatural punishment, or at least views that as a more serious concern than criminal punishment for the
underlying substantive offense. See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 4, at 636-37; Morgan, supra note
5, at 186; Forgotten Offense, supra note 2, at 364 n. 41 (citing Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE L.J.
1329, 1381-89 (1959)).
14. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 440 (1976) (White, J., concurring); Bronston, 409 U.S. at 359-60; Brooks v. Tennessee, 406
U.S. 605, 611 (1972); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966). Credibility factors considered by the factfinder include witness demeanor, intelligence, and ability to observe and otherwise
learn and recall relevant information; the positive or hesitant nature of the testimony, whether the
witnesses appeared certain or doubtful, frank and fair, or evasive and biased; the witness's interest
in the outcome; the extent of support or contradiction by other evidence; and innumerable other
possible considerations. See E. DEVITr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 17.01 (3d ed. 1977); PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4.17.

15. See, eg., Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358-60; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965); Frankel, supra note 2, at 1039; Morgan, supra note 5, at 185; Wolfram, supra note 2, at 813-15, 834.
16. See, eg., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 52 (1978) (upholding the trial court's
consideration of the defendant's false testimony in determining the appropriate sentence, while
acknowledging "[tihe realism of the psychological pressures on a defendant in the dock"). Of
course, the defendant's motivation to lie may depend on the severity of the offenses charged and
other factors such as the defendant's understanding of the strength of the prosecution's case. See,
e.g., Wolfram, supra note 2, at 813.
Historically, because of the defendants' interest, as parties, and the perceived, substantial risk
of their false testimony, defendants were disqualified from giving sworn testimony in their own
behalf. See, eg., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 (1986); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570
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The defendant is also in an advantageous position to lie effectively without
detection despite the traditional trial safeguards."7 The sixth amendment
confrontation clause gives the defendant a right to be present and to hear all
the prosecution's evidence before testifying. 8 This ability to hear all the
evidence is reinforced by the fifth amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination. 19 This privilege has been read to entitle the defendant to
delay his or her testimony further until after presentment of other defense
evidence."0 Thus, the defendant may mold his or her testimony to be consistent with the other evidence, thereby minimizing impeachment and effective cross-examination.
Further, effective cross-examination and
impeachment are hampered by the prosecution's limited opportunity for
pretrial discovery of the defendant's testimony, for discovery of other information, or for committing the defendant to details before he or she takes
the stand.2 1
In addition to the internal trial process safeguards against false testimony, the criminal justice system has traditionally sought to prevent and to
punish false testimony through the offense of perjury, a crime at common
law and by statute in every state and at the federal level.22 However, prose-

(1961); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 579 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
See also Frankel, supra note 2, at 1037 ("Certainly, if one may speak the unspeakable, most defendants who go to trial in criminal cases are not desirous that the whole truth about the matters
in controversy be exposed to scrutiny.... The statistical fact remains that the preponderant
majority of those brought to trial did substantially what they are charged with.... [W]e also
acquit a far larger number who are guilty....").
17. Although some suggest that juries typically discount criminal defendant testimony, the
jury's ability to effectively determine when defendants are lying is questionable. Wolfram, supra
note 2, at 834. Experts suggest that the most important factor in juror acceptance of false testimony is the defendant's ability to lie convincingly. Otherwise, jurors rely on intangible variables
having little to do with the "appropriate" credibility considerations, such as the types of persons
on the jury, their experience with the system, the way in which preemptory challenges were used,
and unconscious signals displayed by the judge. Morgan, supra note 5, at 186; Wolfram, supra
note 2, at 834, 852-53.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20. See, e.g., Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
21. The defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination prevents the government from compelling the defendant to disclose his or her testimony, although it does not preclude mandatory disclosure of the fact the defendant will present a certain kind of defense as well
as the witnesses the defendant intends to utilize, in order to prove that defense. See, e.g., Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
22. For the history and development of the crime of perjury at common law in England and
America, see, e.g., 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1116-17 (S. Kadish ed. 1983) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA];PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 4, at 510-11; Forgotten Offense, supra note
2, at 361-63. The crime of perjury generally proscribes the intentional making of a material false
statement or testimony, under oath or affirmation, in a judicial or other official proceeding. See,
e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra, at 1116-18; MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(1) and comments (1980);
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cutions for perjury are rare and, therefore, the perjury sanction would not
seem to be a very effective deterrent to criminal defendants lying at trial in
an effort to avoid conviction.2 3 Thus, not only do defendants have a strong
motive to falsely testify and an often good opportunity to do so, but also,
even if trial safeguards expose some false testimony, the widespread lack of
perjury prosecutions means that defendants are not effectively discouraged
from availing themselves of their opportunities to lie.24 As a result, defendant perjury is common and undoubtedly successful in procuring the acquittal of guilty persons. This scenario and the significance of the consequences

to the criminal justice system warrant serious consideration of why perjury
prosecutions are so infrequent. 25
When the defendant's perjury is unsuccessful and he or she is convicted
of the offense lied about, a perjury charge might seem clear and easy to
prove, but lack of prosecution is also easily understood. Prosecutors exercising their virtually absolute discretion whether to charge necessarily consider how best to use limited prosecutorial and judicial resources to serve

appropriate criminal law objectives. The convicted defendant is already
subject to incarcerative control for that offense. In view of limited rePERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 4, at 512-13; Gershman, supra note 3, at 624 n.3; Forgotten Offense, supra note 2, at 362. Several states proscribe more than one perjury offense by establishing
different grades of perjury, or by defining one offense as pejury and another as false swearing.
The differences between the offenses are ordinarily based upon: (1) whether false statements were
made during judicial proceedings (perjury or a higher grade of the offense) or outside of court
(false swearing or lower grades of pejury); and (2) whether the false statement was material
(perjury or the higher grade require materiality, false swearing or lower grades do not). See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 comments at 115-16, 120-21, 126-29, § 241.2 comments at 144-45
(1980); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 4, at 512. In addition, most jurisdictions proscribe "subornation of perjury" - the intentional procuring of another person to commit perjury. PERKINS &
BOYCE, supra note 4, at 524-26.
23. See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 2, at 813-14 n.15; Forgotten Offense, supra note 2, at 361,
372 nn. 6-12; Perjury by Defendants,supra note 2, at 752 n.1; Perjury in Kansas, supra note 2, at
479 n.2. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice concluded in 1967-68 that the federal perjury sanction was not a sufficiently effective deterrent to false
testimony because so few perjury prosecutions were brought. The Commission recommended, the
Senate Judiciary Committee sponsored, and Congress enacted as part of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, a new perjury statute with lower proof requirements to increase the number
of perjury prosecutions and thereby provide greater incentive for truthful testimony. Statistics
show that the number of federal perjury prosecutions increased significantly after passage of this
new statute. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 comments at 95 (1980) ("[T]he prevalence of
perjury has led to a marked tightening of former law."); Gershman, supra note 4, at 627-28 n. 10;
Forgotten Offense, supra note 2, at 368 ("[A] strict enforcement policy and the perception of this
policy by the public may act as a deterrent to future perjury.") ("[I]f witnesses believe that perjury
will be prosecuted, then a deterrent effect may reasonably be expected.").
24. See, e.g., Forgotten Offense, supra note 2, at 368, 371.
25. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 comment at 95 (1980); Gershman, supra note 4,
at 624-25 n.4, 627-28 n.10; Forgotten Offense, supra note 2, at 364.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:703

sources, the burdens of a prosecution and trial on perjury charges will ordinarily outweigh the benefits of additional punishment. 6 Moreover, the
criminal law interests behind the perjury sanction may be partially served
without a separate perjury prosecution because the trial judge can take into
account the defendant's false testimony in fixing an appropriate sentence for
the underlying offense.2 7 Although it may be impermissible for the judge to
increase the sentence solely as punishment for the perjury (as opposed to
considering perjury relevant to rehabilitation and restraint regarding the
convicted offense)," a sentence increased because of perjury would incidentally serve to punish and to restrain perjury. In addition, if this enhanced
sentencing practice occurs regularly and is publicized, it would tend, albeit
incidentally, to deter defendant perjury.
Other reasons often suggested to explain why prosecutors decline to
charge perjury include evidentiary considerations, particularly those caused
by the materiality element of perjury and the so-called "two witness rule." 9
Although these considerations may well reduce the number of prosecutions,
they may not be inappropriate in view of the reasons for these requirements
and the legitimate interests they serve. The materiality element requires
proof that the testimony, whether on a main point in issue or on a collateral
matter, was capable of or could have influenced or affected the verdict. 0
This requirement is tied to the interests implicated by false testimony; it
serves to limit perjury prosecutions to cases in which there is some risk that
26. See, e.g., Forgotten Offense, supra note 2, at 368.
27. This practice was upheld in United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978), where the
United States Supreme Court held that the trial judge could consider the defendant's false testimony as a legitimate factor in fixing an appropriate sentence. The Court reasoned that "[a] defendant's truthfulness or mendacity while testifying on his own behalf, almost without exception,
has been deemed probative of his attitudes toward society and prospects for rehabilitation and
hence relevant to sentencing." Id. at 50. The Court concluded that consideration of the defendant's false testimony did not necessarily constitute punishment for perjury without indictment,
trial, and conviction of that offense, in violation of due process. Although the Court assumed it
would be improper to incarcerate the defendant for the underlying offense solely as punishment
for the perjury, it thought the risk of impropriety was outweighed by the judge's need to consider
all information relevant to sentencing. The Court also reasoned that the judge's integrity was
adequate assurance against impropriety. Id. at 53-54. In addition, the Court concluded that consideration of the defendant's false testimony in sentencing did not impermissibly chill the defendant's right to testify in his or her own behalf because that right was only "the right to testify
truthfully in accordance with the oath ....There is no protected right to commit perjury." Id. at
54.
28. Id. at 53-54.
29. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 comments at 95; Gershman, supra note 4, at 62728 n.10; Forgotten Offense, supra note 2, at 364-65.
30. See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, at 1117; MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 comments at 118 (1980); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 4, at 519-20; Forgotten Offense, supra note 2,
at 365-66.
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the testimony influenced the outcome of the original proceedings.
Although all false testimony should be discouraged, materiality balances
this concern against the need to protect witnesses from the threat of serious
criminal charges for minor errors in testimony and the consequent potential
for discouraging testimony. This balance is effectuated further by those jurisdictions that punish false testimony without materiality as a lesser offense
or lower grade of pejury.3 1
The so-called "two witness rule" is the most often cited reason for the
low incidence of perjury prosecutions.3 2 This quantitative rule of evidence
prohibits proof of falsity by the testimony of only one witness-falsity must
be shown by the testimony of two independent witnesses or one witness plus
independent corroborative evidence. 3 Although this rule creates barriers
to perjury prosecutions, 3 4 its purpose is to encourage witnesses to testify by
avoiding the "over-deterrence" that would result if prosecutions could be
brought when the allegedly false testimony was simply a different recollection or explanation of the same event.3 ' Thus, like materiality, this rule
attempts to strike an appropriate balance between preventing false testimony while encouraging witnesses to testify and protecting a defendant's
right to present a defense.3 6
A.

Perjury ProsecutionsAfter Acquittals: ConstitutionalObstacles

These evidentiary considerations influence the decision to charge defendants with perjury whether they were previously convicted or acquitted.
After an acquittal, however, the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy, and more particularly the collateral estoppel doctrine included
within the double jeopardy clause, pose substantial obstacles to perjury
prosecutions. The number of charges considered and declined by prosecu31. See, e-g., ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, at 1117 ("The modem trend is to treat material-

ity as a factor relating to the grading of the offense, and never to permit complete exoneration on
this ground."); MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 and comments (1980) (recommending differentiation between offenses of perjury and false swearing based on the materiality element); PERKINS &
BOYCE, supra note 4, at 519-21; Forgotten Offense, supra note 2, at 366.
32. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 comments at 137, 140 (1980); Gershman, supra
note 4, at 624-25 n.4, 627-28 n.10; Forgotten Offense, supra note 2, at 366-67.
33. See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, at 1118; MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 com-

ments at 137-41 (1980); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 4, at 523-24; Forgotten Offense, supra note
2, at 367.

34. See, e.g., Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 609 (1945); Gershman, supra note 4, at
627-28 n.10.
35. See, e.g., Weiler, 323 U.S. at 609; ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, at 1118; MODEL PENAL
CODE § 241.1 comments at 137-41; Forgotten Offense, supra note 2, at 367.
36. Cf. People v. White, 411 Mich. 366, 308 N.W.2d 128 (1981); People v. Longuemire, 87
Mich. App. 395, 275 N.W.2d 12 (1978).
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tors because of these constitutional principles is unknowable, but a significant number of cases applying these and similar principles to perjury after
acquittal cases have been decided and reported by state and federal courts.
Although these reported decisions date back to the late 1800s, it was not
until 1970 that the United States Supreme Court held in Ashe v. Swenson 37
that the federal rule of collateral estoppel in criminal cases was embodied in
the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause, applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. The post-Ashe cases, however, have
not clearly articulated or applied the Ashe collateral estoppel standards.
Perhaps this is because collateral estoppel is not the best approach to the
problems of prosecuting for perjury after acquittal. Therefore, this leaves
two questions to be answered. The first is, what are the appropriate standards for applying the constitutional collateral estoppel mandates of Ashe?
Secondly, is there a more appropriate approach to preventing perjury by
criminal defendants, without violating constitutional double jeopardy interests and protections?
B.

Double Jeopardy Interests and Protections

The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment, 38 provides that no person shall
"be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." 39 This constitutional guarantee serves a variety of important values
and interests, 4° and provides several related protections.4 1 The United
37. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Most states have comparable double jeopardy provisions in their
state constitutions. See, e.g., Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 262-63 n.3 (1965) [hereinafter Twice in Jeopardy].
40. A complicating feature of double jeopardy law is that "[t]he prohibition is not one rule
but several, each applying to a different situation; and each rule is marooned in a sea of exceptions." Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 39, at 263. This Note discusses in detail the various double
jeopardy protections and the "[s]everal policies [that] underlie the double jeopardy prohibition,"
noting that "policy confusion is the chief confusion in double jeopardy law." Id. at 266 n. 14. The
United States Supreme Court summarized what it regarded as "essentially settled" double jeopardy principles in United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 127-31 (1980) (holding that a
statutory provision granting a government the right to appeal a sentence did not violate double
jeopardy). The confusion and complications regarding double jeopardy law and policy have required repeated attention by the Supreme Court in recent years. See, e.g., DiFrancesco,449 U.S.
at 126-27 (where the Court listed its many double jeopardy decisions of the past decade); Sanabria
v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 80 (1978) (Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion, comments on
the "continuing struggle to create order and understanding out of the confusion of the lengthening
list of [the Court's] decisions on the Double Jeopardy Clause.").
41. In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), the Court summarized the traditional
double jeopardy clause protections: "It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense
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States Supreme Court has described the "general design of the double jeopardy clause"'42 as follows:
The constitutional prohibition against 'double jeopardy' was
designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the
hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense.... The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained
in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the
state with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent
he may be found guilty.43
These considerations are especially important when the proceedings result in an acquittal. As the Court recently explained:
An acquittal is accorded special weight. 'The constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial
following an acquittal,' for the 'public interest in the finality of criminal judgments is so strong that an acquitted defendant may not be
retried even though the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.' If the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes
that a second trial would be unfair.' The law 'attaches particular
significance to an acquittal.'"
The conclusiveness of an acquittal protects the defendant against "the
agony and risks attendant upon undergoing more than one criminal trial,"4 5
limiting the state "with all its resources and power" to one opportunity to
convict,4 6 without a second opportunity "to supply evidence which it failed
after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.
And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." Id. at 717 (footnotes omitted). The Court later noted that "[t]his recital has been described as this Court's 'favorite saying
about double jeopardy.'" DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 129 n.10. In addition, the double jeopardy
clause protects defendants in certain cases against retrial following a mistrial or hung jury, thus
"embrac[ing] the defendant's 'valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.'"
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689
(1949)). Double jeopardy also prohibits relitigation of issues already resolved in the defendant's
favor at an earlier trial. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (discussed infra at notes 59-68).
42. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 127.
43. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957), quoted in DiFrancesco,449 U.S. at
127-28.
44. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 129 (quoting Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143
(1962); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91
(1978)).
45. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 105 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. See, e.g., Twice in Jeopardy,supra note 39, at 277-78.
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to muster in the first proceeding."'4 7 The concern here is "that if the Government may reprosecute, it gains an advantage from what it learns at the
first trial about the strengths of the defense case and the weaknesses of its
own,"4 8 thereby "enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he
may be found guilty."4 9
In addition, the interest in maintaining the finality and integrity of the
judgment of acquittal gives this aspect of double jeopardy protection special
significance. The Supreme Court has often stated that one purpose of
double jeopardy, if not its primary purpose, is to preserve the finality and
integrity of judgments.5" When a trial ends with an acquittal, these interests are more pressing, for while an acquittal on the merits does not represent a determination of innocence in any absolute sense, there is clearly a
distinction between a judgment of acquittal and the termination of trial on a
basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence.5 1 Certainly the judgment of
acquittal creates a greater risk of later convicting an innocent person. Thus,
the special significance of a judgment of acquittal under double jeopardy
corresponds with other fundamental values of our system: that accused persons are presumed innocent, shifting the burden of proving guilt to the
state; that it is better a guilty person go free than an innocent person be

47. DiFrancesco,449 U.S. at 128 (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978)).
48. Id. at 128. See also Scott, 437 U.S. at 105 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by White,
Marshall, Stevens, J.J.); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975). See, e.g., Washington,
434 U.S. at 504 n.14 (describing how subtle changes in the prosecution's testimony that is unfa-

vorable to the defendant may occur at a second trial); Ashe, 397 U.S. 436 (where subtle changes in
the prosecution's evidence unfavorable to the defendant did occur at the second trial, such that

defendant was convicted after an earlier acquittal).
49. Green, 355 U.S. at 188.
50. See, e.g., DiFrancesco,449 U.S. at 128; Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978); Scott, 437
U.S. at 92.
51. Scott, 437 U.S. at 98 n. 11. The Scott decision makes clear the special significance of an
acquittal is based on more than general concerns about multiple prosecutions. The Court held
that the defendant could be retried after a mid-trial (post attachment of jeopardy) dismissal, because the dismissal did not constitute an "acquittal." The dismissal was ordered on the grounds of
prejudicial pre-arrest delay violating due process, "a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence
of the offense." Id. at 98-99. The Scott dissenters asserted that double jeopardy should bar further

proceedings after all mid-trial dismissals, regardless of whether they might be characterized as
determinations of innocence: "The reason for this rule [against retrial after acquittal] is not, as the

Court suggests, primarily to safeguard determinations of innocence; rather, it is that a retrial
following a final judgment for the accused necessarily threatens intolerable interference with the
constitutional policy against multiple trials." Id. at 104 (Brennan, J., dissenting). By not adopting
the dissenters' view and by not broadly prohibiting retrial after all judgments for defendants dur-

ing trial, but instead focusing on "acquittals," the Scott majority made clear that the complete
basis for the special rule regarding reprosecutions after acquittal was tied to safeguarding determinations of innocence. Id. at 101.
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convicted; and that the system depends upon the respect accorded to the
fact-finder's verdict. 2
These special values have lead the Supreme Court to provide special
protections. The Court has held that an acquitted defendant cannot be retried for the same offense no matter how egregiously erroneous the acquittal
might have been.5 3 The Court has also broadly defined "acquittal" to include a judge or jury verdict of not guilty, and any "judgment of acquittal"
entered by the judge after the attachment of jeopardy, on the ground that
the evidence presented was insufficient to support a conviction - any "ruling of the judge, whatever its label, [that] actually represents a resolution [in
the defendant's favor], correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements
of the offense charged." 54 In contrast, prosecution is permitted following
"termination of the proceedings ... on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or
'55
innocence of the offense."
The primary, traditional double jeopardy protection, expressed by the
words of the clause itself, is the bar against successive prosecutions of the
52. See, e.g., Twice in Jeopardy,supra note 39, at 277-78.
53. See, e.g., Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 69 (1978) (retrial barred despite the trial
judge's erroneous exclusion of evidence at trial, which lead to an acquittal for insufficient evidence); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (retrial barred even though the
judgment of acquittal was entered before the government had finished presenting its case-in-chief,
"based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation" of supposed prosecutorial misconduct or supposed lack of government witness credibility).
54. Scott, 437 U.S. at 97 (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,
571 (1977)). The Court has found "acquittals" in a variety of situations under this broad definition. See, e.g., Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140 (1986) (trial court sustained defendant's
demurrer at the close of prosecution's case-in-chief on ground that evidence was insufficient to
convict); Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981) (trial court's determination, based on defendant's motion for new trial after guilty verdict, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain conviction); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (appellate court reversal of a conviction on
grounds that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict); United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (trial judge's entry ofjudgment of acquittal because of insufficient
evidence following jury's discharge after failure to reach a verdict). Cf. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S.
31 (1982) (reversal of conviction due to "weight of the evidence," rather than sufficiency of evidence, does not constitute acquittal). For an excellent article on the Court's treatment of acquittals, see Strazzella, Commonwealth Appeals andDouble Jeopardy,4 PA. L.J. No. 39 at 11-13, No.
40 at 11-13 (Oct. 19, 26, 1981).
The Court has even extended the special status of an "acquittal," by analogy, to capital sentencing proceedings conducted under state law procedures that required a hearing and determination closely resembling a trial on guilt or innocence. The Court concluded that a verdict in such a
proceeding, fixing the penalty at life imprisonment, constituted an "implied acquittal" of the death
penalty, so that even if the penalty verdict was erroneous, the death penalty was not available at a
new trial after reversal of the conviction. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984); Bullington v.
Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981). Cf. DiFrancesco,449 U.S. 117 (1980) (holding that ordinarily the
imposition of a sentence does not constitute an implied acquittal of a higher sentence).
55. Scott, 437 U.S. at 98-99 (1978).
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same defendant for the identical offense. 6 Prosecution for perjury after acquittal of some other substantive crime does not violate this prohibition.
Perjury and the earlier offense are simply not the "same offense" for double
jeopardy purposes.5 7 The accepted test for determining whether the offenses are the same is the so-called "same evidence" test. This test states
that offenses are not the same if the elements of each require proof of a fact
which the other does not.5 Certainly, the elements of perjury require proof
56. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). The protection against
successive prosecutions was derived historically from the common law pleas in bar of autrefois
acquit and autrefoisconvict. DiFrancesco,449 U.S. at 133. See also Twice in Jeopardy,supra note
39, at 262 n.1, 265-66 nn. 11-12. These pleas "had as their objective the absolute bar of a second
trial." Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1960).
57. See, eg., United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 62 (1951); Adams v. United States, 287
F.2d 701, 702 (5th Cir. 1961); State v. Gunn, 381 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
People v. White, 411 Mich. 366, 379, 308 N.W.2d 128, 133 (1981); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note
4, at 522; Perjuryby Defendants, supra note 2, at 753-54.
58. See, e.g., Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 416 (1980); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682,
683 (1977); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977). The "same evidence" test focuses on the
statutory elements of the offenses, not the evidence presented to prove them, except that with
regard to greater and lesser included offenses, two offenses may constitute the "same offense" if
one is a necessary element of the other as a matter of law, or if, under the facts of the particular
case, one was a necessary element of the other although it might not always be the case. Vitale,
447 U.S. at 416; Harris,433 U.S. at 682-83.
The "same evidence" test has been criticized as being too narrow to provide much protection
against successive prosecution, particularly in view of the modem proliferation of statutory offenses that may be charged based upon the same general conduct, yet require proof of different
particular facts. See, e.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448-60 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring,
joined by Douglas & Marshall, J.J.); Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432
(1973), vacated and remanded,414 U.S. 808 (1973), on remand, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854 (1974);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 comments at 116-26 (1985); 8A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 29, 29-48 through 29-51 (rev. 1988); 1B J. MOORE, J.
LUCAS, T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.418 [2] (2d ed. 1984); Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 56, at 29-30; Perjury by Defendants, supra note 2, at 757; Twice in Jeopardy,
supra note 39, at 267-75; Recent Developments, CollateralEstoppel is ConstitutionallyRequired in
CriminalCases Because it is Embodied in the Fifth Amendment Double JeopardyClause - Ashe v.
Swenson, 69 MICH. L. REV. 762, 767-68 (1971) [hereinafter Recent Developments]. The most
common suggestion has been to replace the "same evidence" test with the "same transaction" or
"same criminal episode" test, which would define the "same offense" as all offenses arising out of
the identical criminal transaction or episode. See, e.g., Ashe, 397 U.S. at 448-60 (Brennan J.,
concurring); Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 39, at 275-77. Indeed, many states, by rule or statute,
require compulsory joinder for trial of all offenses derived from the same conduct or arising out of
the same transaction or criminal episode. These states also prohibit separate trials for such offenses, with certain exceptions. Id. at 292-96. The compulsory joinder provisions largely follow
the recommendation of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code. MODEL PENAL CODE
§§ 1.07(2), 1.09(l)(b) comments at 116-26 (1985). See, e.g., Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432;
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 109-12 (Purdon 1983); Comment, Commonwealth v. Campana &
Section 110 of the Crimes Code: Fraternal Twins, 35 U. PITr. L. REV. 275 (1973). Perjury and
the offense for which the defendant was earlier acquitted do not constitute the same offense under
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of facts not required to be proven by the elements of the offense for which
the defendant was earlier acquitted, and vice versa.
C. Ashe v. Swensor Double Jeopardy and CollateralEstoppel
The collateral estoppel doctrine does, however, provide significant protection against prosecutions for perjury after an acquittal. In Ashe v. Swenson,5 9 the United States Supreme Court defined collateral estoppel as
meaning "simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated
between the same parties in any future lawsuit."' The Ashe Court held
that the rule of collateral estoppel which had been developed in federal
criminal cases was embodied in the double jeopardy clause.6 ' Because collateral estoppel is embodied in double jeopardy, it was applicable in state
criminal cases under the fourteenth amendment.6 2
The Court did not extensively articulate its reasoning in Ashe, using an
almost a fortiori analysis. It recognized that traditional double jeopardy
interests demanded that collateral estoppel be a constitutional requirement
in view of developments that were eroding the effectiveness of the traditional protection against successive prosecutions for the "same offense."
any definition of identical transaction or episode. See, e.g., United States v. Gremillion, 464 F.2d
901, 906 (5th Cir. 1972); People v. Longuemire, 87 Mich. App. 395, 397, 275 N.W.2d 12, 14
(1978); Commonwealth v. Hude, 492 Pa. 600, 610, 425 A.2d 313, 318-19 (1980); Perjury by Defendants, supra note 2, at 754.
59. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
60. Id. at 443. Collateral estoppel is more descriptively referred to as "issue preclusion."
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); United States v. Sarno, 596 F.2d
404, 408 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1973)); Hude, 492 Pa. at 617, 425 A.2d at 322. The doctrine was developed in civil cases as a
corollary to res judicata or "claim preclusion." Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443. For discussion and authorities on collateral estoppel in civil cases, see 18 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.4410.448 (1984); Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 56, at 3 n.10; Twice in Jeopardy,supra note 39, at
283 n.104. Courts sometimes speak in confused and inaccurate terms about these various preclusion doctrines; they are not clear that, although the express bar to reprosecution for the "same
offense" and the Ashe collateral estoppel rule are separate protections covering different situations,
both are federal constitutional, double jeopardy mandates. See, e.g., State v. Gunn, 381 So. 2d
1186, 1187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); People v. Shlensky, 118 Ill.
App. 3d 243,454 N.E.2d 1103,
1105 (1983); Myers v. State, 57 Md. App. 325, 328, 470 A.2d 355, 356 (1984).
61. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445. In Ashe, the defendant was charged with six separate counts of
robbery, one each for the six individual victims in the robbery of a single poker game. After a trial
and acquittal on one count, the defendant was tried on a second count and convicted. The Court
concluded from its review of the record that the only rationally conceivable basis for the earlier
acquittal was that the jury was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
one of the robbers. The Court held that collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of the identity
issue and, therefore, barred the second trial and conviction. Id.
62. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969).
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The Court was concerned that the recent proliferation of criminal offenses
made it possible to charge one defendant with a number of "different" offenses based on the same criminal conduct, thereby increasing the potential
for unfair and abusive multiple prosecutions.6 3 After discussing how the
federal courts had successfully applied collateral estoppel to prevent these
abuses,' the Ashe Court concluded that the purposes behind the doctrine
were identical to double jeopardy interests.6 5 Both were intended to protect
63. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445 n.10.
64. Id. at 443-44. The Supreme Court had first held that collateral estoppel was applicable in
federal criminal cases in United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916), reasoning that the
doctrine which protected litigants from simple civil liabilities should certainly also protect defendants liable for criminal sanctions involving potential loss of life, liberty, and property. For a
succinct, general history of collateral estoppel in criminal cases before Ashe, see Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 56, at 28-31. The Ashe Court cited several other federal collateral estoppel
cases and relied heavily on its earlier opinion in Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948),
which held that prosecution for aiding and abetting one Greenberg in defrauding the government
was barred under res judicata/collateral estoppel because defendant had earlier been acquitted by
a jury of conspiracy to defraud the government and the earlier verdict had determined in defendant's favor facts essential to conviction in the second prosecution; both cases depended on a finding that a letter written by the defendant to Greenberg had been written pursuant to an agreement
between them to defraud the government and, therefore, the second prosecution was simply an
attempt to prove the existence of an agreement that the first jury had necessarily found to have
been non-existent.
Although certainly the Ashe Court could not make collateral estoppel a constitutional requirement simply because of its established use in the federal courts, the doctrine's long and successful
application in federal criminal cases, as well as its accepted fairness, provided a practical framework for the Court's determination of the constitutional question. See, e.g., Recent Developments, supra note 58, at 765-66.
It is interesting to note that the Court has not consistently followed its early Oppenheimer
reasoning about the need to provide criminal defendants the same protection as civil litigants.
Justice Brennan, concurring in Ashe, discussed how the res judicata doctrine in civil cases had
developed into a "same transaction" type test to protect against multiplicity of actions. He concluded: "Yet, if the Double Jeopardy Clause were interpreted by this Court to incorporate the
,same evidence' test [which the Court later did adopt], criminal defendants would have less protection from multiple trials than civil defendants. This anomaly would be intolerable." Ashe, 397
U.S. at 456-57 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 39, at 296-99
(discussing how the civil res judicata doctrine and criminal double jeopardy concepts were originally created for the same reasons, but the civil doctrine matured into a broad compulsory joinder
rule providing more protection than double jeopardy, which remained restrictive and relatively
unprotective).
65. See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165-66 (1977) (double jeopardy "serves 'a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit' . . . [which] policy protects the accused from
attempts to relitigate the facts underlying a prior acquittal, and from attempts to secure additional
punishment after a prior conviction and sentence." (citations omitted)); Hude, 492 Pa. at 612, 425
A.2d at 319 (collateral estoppel intended to enhance traditional double jeopardy protection and to
provide relief from the growing threat of multiple prosecutions); Comment, supra note 2, at 757;
Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: CollateralEstoppelHeld Inapplicable to Subsequent PerjuryProsecution of CriminalDefendant, 60 MINN. L. REV. 597, 598 (1976); Perjury by Defendants, supra
note 2, at 757; Recent Developments, supra note 58, at 766-69. Perhaps the real reason for the
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defendants against reprosecution or relitigation after acquittal. The Court
therefore reasoned that it was constitutionally no different whether the reprosecution was for the exact same offense or whether it simply involved the
same issue that had already been determined in the defendant's favor.6 6
The Ashe Court also articulated standards governing the collateral estoppel rule which it incorporated into double jeopardy. It explained that
collateral estoppel could not be applied in a hyper-technical, restrictive
manner that would allow a later court to conclude that an earlier acquittal
was based on the jury's rejection of substantial, uncontradicted prosecution
Ashe decision, however, was that a majority of the Court clearly thought the second prosecution
should not be constitutionally permissible in light of the prosecutor's admission that he was using
the first trial as a "dry run" for the second. The Court could not find a due process violation due
to the effect that had been given its decision in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958). See
Recent Developments, supra note 58, at 763. The Court could not deal with the problem under
the traditional double jeopardy bar to reprosecution for the "same offense" because a majority was
evidently unwilling to adopt a "same transaction" test, rather than a "same evidence" test, even
though factually Ashe was a clear case of several "offenses" arising out of one "transaction."
Ashe, 397 U.S. at 448-60 (Brennan, J., concurring). Thus, the Ashe majority chose to incorporate
collateral estoppel into double jeopardy to serve the same interests.
66. Specifically, the Ashe Court explained:
After the first jury had acquitted the petitioner of robbing Knight, Missouri could certainly not have brought him to trial again upon that charge. Once a jury had determined
upon conflicting testimony that there was at least a reasonable doubt that the petitioner
was one of the robbers, the State could not present the same or different identification
evidence in a second prosecution for the robbery of Knight in the hope that a different jury
might find that evidence more convincing. The situation is constitutionally no different
here, even though the second trial related to another victim of the same robbery. For the
name of the victim, in the circumstances of this case, had no bearing whatever upon the
issue of whether the petitioner was one of the robbers.
In this case the State in its brief has frankly conceded that following the petitioner's
acquittal, it treated the first trial as no more than a dry run for the second prosecution:
"No doubt the prosecutor felt the state had a provable case on the first charge and, when
he lost, he did what every good attorney would do - he refined his presentation in light of
the turn of events at the first trial." But this is precisely what the constitutional guarantee
forbids.
Ashe, 397 U.S. at 446-47. The Court also stated that double jeopardy and collateral estoppel both
protect an acquitted defendant "from having to 'run the gauntlet' a second time." Id. at 446
(quoting, Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957)). Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in
Ashe, asserted that this "colorful and graphic phrase" was the "only expressed rationale for the
majority's decision" - a "decision by slogan." Id. at 465 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This "slogan" was "not a doctrine of the law or legal reasoning" and was taken out of context; it was
intended only to mean that double jeopardy protected against successive prosecutions for the
"same offense," as defined by the "same evidence" test, which was the only double jeopardy protection. Id. at 460-61, 463-65 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Interestingly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in effect, adopted a corruption of Chief Justice Burger's reasoning to limit the applicability of the collateral estoppel doctrine, as a matter of
New Jersey state law, when the offenses involved in the two prosecutions are as different as a
substantive crime and perjury committed by the defendant at the trial for that crime. State v.
Redinger, 64 N.J. 41, 312 A.2d 129 (1973).
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evidence on a point the defendant did not contest.6 7 Instead, the Court
required a realistic, rational approach based upon a practical review of all
the circumstances of the proceedings.68 It stated:
Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general
verdict, as is usually the case, this approach requires a court to examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the
pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude
whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from
consideration.69
The point of the Ashe decision was that these federal collateral estoppel
standards and principles were part of constitutional double jeopardy protection and, as such, were applicable fully in state criminal cases under the
fourteenth amendment. 7' Thus, the relitigation problems discussed in Ashe
were to be consistently resolved in state and federal courts. In prosecutions
for perjury after acquittal, however, consistency has yet to be attained. Not
all the courts that have decided perjury after acquittal cases, post-Ashe,
have undertaken the mandated realistic, rational, practical review of the
record to decide whether the jury could have based its verdicts on some
issue not involved in the later prosecution. Differences in the articulation
and application of collateral estoppel standards are evident among the various state and lower federal courts that have decided these cases. Undoubtedly, some of the differences are related to the courts' respective views of
67. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 n.9 (quoting Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 56, at 38).
68. Id. at 444 (quoting Sealfon, 332 U.S. at 579).
69. Id. (quoting Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 56, at 38-39).
70. Later Supreme Court cases have enhanced constitutional collateral estoppel protections.
See, e.g., Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 (1972) (holding that a second prosecution for robbery
was precluded by an acquittal of a felony murder based on the same transaction and evidence,
even though under state law no offense could be tried jointly with murder. The record showed
that the jury had acquitted the defendant because it found that he was not a participant in the
robbery-murder); Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384 (1971) (vacating state court decision permitting prosecution for robbery of store customer after acquittal of robbing store manager; the decision was made on grounds that the acquittal had been a retrial after reversal of the defendant's
conviction so that "double collateral estoppel" existed on the issue of the defendant's identity
(conviction and acquittal cancelled each other out), holding "mutuality of estoppel" (against defendant based on conviction) not part of double jeopardy collateral estoppel rule); Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55 (1971) (rejecting state court's analysis that although a second murder trial (for
murder of one victim) would require relitigation of the same ultimate fact (defendant's identity)
determined in defendant's favor at the first trial (for the murder of a different victim during the
same incident), a second trial was permitted because the prosecution had not had a full, fair
opportunity to prove the issue due to erroneous evidentiary ruling excluding evidence of identity
that would be admissible at the second trial. The Court reasoned that "the constitutional guarantee applies, irrespective of whether the jury considered all relevant evidence, and irrespective of
the good faith of the State in bringing successive prosecutions." Id. at 56-57).
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the relative weights to be given to the competing anti-perjury and double
jeopardy interests and policies. Also, some courts have probably misunderstood the Ashe requirements. Perhaps, the Ashe collateral estoppel principles are not the best approach to the perjury after acquittal cases.
Certainly, in perjury after acquittal cases, there are strong countervailing
anti-perjury policy considerations that do not exist in ordinary collateral
estoppel cases. Therefore, some courts have most likely struggled with, and
not clearly applied, the Ashe standards.
The differences and deficiencies in the post-Ashe perjury after acquittal
cases and the perception that some other approach would be preferable may
be a result of the continued influence, consciously or unconsciously, of the
large number of perjury after acquittal cases decided before Ashe. A brief
discussion of these earlier cases and the possible extent of their continued
impact is a useful background for an understanding of the post-Ashe cases.
These earlier cases also suggest and support potential alternatives to collateral estoppel.
D. The Continued Influence of Pre-Ashe Perjury After Acquittal Cases
Before Ashe, the state courts were more concerned about the evils of
perjury than about individual or systematic interests in avoiding reprosecution after acquittal. Although a few courts made a meaningful effort to
apply modem collateral estoppel standards,7 1 most either upheld perjury
prosecutions on policy grounds, without any consideration of what issues
might have been determined at the earlier trial, or concluded, without real
analysis, that the earlier not guilty verdict did not determine any issues in
the perjury prosecution.
Those cases which held an "absolute no bar" on policy grounds rejected
res judicata/collateral estoppel concepts in perjury prosecutions and upheld
prosecutions even when the allegedly false testimony was the defendant's
denial of guilt generally, or concerned an essential element of the earlier
offense.7 2 The evils of false testimony were considered so great that public
71. See, e.g., Yarbrough v. State, 79 Fla. 256, 83 So. 873 (1920); People v. Albers, 137 Mich.
678, 100 N.W. 908 (1904); State v. Smith, 119 Minn. 107, 137 N.W. 295 (1912); State v. Reynolds,
100 P.2d 593 (Or. 1940).
72. See, e.g., Jay v. State, 15 Ala. App. 255, 73 So. 137 (1916); State v. Noble, 2 Ariz. App.
532, 410 P.2d 489 (1966); People v. Barnes, 240 Cal. App. 2d 428, 49 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1966); State
v. Vandemark, 77 Conn. 201, 58 A. 715 (1904); People v. Niles, 300 Ill. 458, 133 N.E. 252 (1921);
Teague v. Commonwealth, 172 Ky. 665, 189 S.W. 908 (1916); State v. Bissell, 106 Vt. 80, 170 A.
102 (1934); Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 371, 38 S.E.2d 485 (1946). Other cases seemed
only to reason that perjury and the earlier crime were simply not the same offense. See, e.g., State
v. Carey, 159 Ind. 504, 65 N.E. 527 (1902); State v. Caywood, 96 Iowa 367, 65 N.W. 385 (1895);
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policy demanded absolute enforcement of the perjury sanction against acquitted defendants who would otherwise commit two crimes without punishment. Finality interests were simply outweighed; concerns about
harassment of defendants and conviction of innocent persons who had already been acquitted were simply too remote to be of importance. 3
These "absolute no bar" cases may still have impact. Many are from
states that have no reported post-Ashe perjury after acquittal cases. Some
post-Ashe opinions and commentaries have asserted the continued viability
of the older decisions. For example, in State v. DeSchepper,7 4 the Minnesota Supreme Court suggested that the "no bar" rule was still acceptable
and included it among the five rules it said had been advocated by courts
and commentators.7 5 Similarly, the New Jersey Superior Court in People v.
McCue 76 asserted that most jurisdictions uphold perjury prosecutions after
acquittal, quoting with approval the "absolute no bar" rationale. 77 Also, in
the most recent edition of their criminal law text, Perkins and Boyce con-

Murtf v. State, 76 Tex. Crim. 5, 172 S.W. 238 (1914); Dickerson v. State, 18 Wyo. 440, 111 P. 857
(1910).
73. The "absolute no bar" cases reasoned that res judicata and collateral estoppel were technical, artificial doctrines based on demands for an end to litigation, but this did not guarantee
immunity to criminals. Indeed, every interest of public policy demanded that perjurers not be
shielded from prosecution by such technicalities, because perjury struck at the very heart of the
administration of justice. If perjury went unpunished, the proper resolution of disputes would be
threatened, and the courts would be held up to contempt. If a defendant could procure an acquittal by false testimony and thereby be immune from trial for perjury, the defendant would be
perpetrating fraud upon the court by securing an acquittal and then having the fraud sanctioned
by making the acquittal conclusive. This would encourage perjury and would allow a defendant
to take advantage of his own wrong; to commit two crimes without punishment for either. See,
e.g., Jay, 15 Ala. App. at 261, 73 So. at 139; Niles, 300 Ill. at 463, 133 N.E. at 253-54.
74. 304 Minn. 399, 231 N.W.2d 294 (1975).
75. Id. at 402, 231 N.W.2d at 297. The DeSchepper court concluded, "No 'majority rule'
suggests itself upon a reading of the more than 50 reported cases which have considered the
problem." Id. at 404, 231 N.W.2d at 297. The court also stated:
There is a respectable body of authority which concludes that the concepts of res judicata
and collateral estoppel do not apply to a judgment procured by fraud or perjury. Some
suggest that Ashe does not require a state to give collateral-estoppel effect to a verdict of
acquittal if the defendant committed perjury to obtain it. In the context of civil litigation
we have held that a civil verdict procured by fraud will not collaterally estop relitigation of
the issues already adjudicated.
Id. at 407, 231 N.W.2d at 299 (citations omitted). For further discussion of the suggestion that
perjury/fraud should be an exception to double jeopardy and collateral-estoppel, see infra text and
accompanying notes 130-60.
76. 122 N.J. Super. 171, 299 A.2d 744 (1973).
77. Id. at 175, 299 A.2d at 746-47. The court also concluded that even under the minority,
"more liberal position" that perjury is precluded when it relates to matters necessarily determined
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tinue to assert, as the prevailing view, that collateral estoppel does not preclude a perjury prosecution after an acquittal.78
Certainly the influence of the strong anti-perjury policy considerations
as expressed in the "absolute no bar" cases would affect the likelihood of
post-Ashe courts upholding perjury prosecutions after acquittal. Courts influenced by these earlier cases and considerations would be more inclined to
give the prosecution the benefit of the doubt in applying collateral estoppel
standards, some even go so far as to place the burden on the defendant to
prove what was determined by the earlier acquittal.79 Indeed, perjury prosecutions have been upheld after acquittals in all the cases in which the
courts expressly placed the burden of proof on the defendant,8" and the
overall tone of the opinions in these cases seemed to favor a "no bar" posi-

tion.8" These older cases and their strong anti-perjury policy rationales
by the earlier acquittal, the perjury prosecution based on defendant's alibi testimony was not
barred. Id.
In State v. Redinger, 64 N.J. 41, 312 A.2d 129 (1973), the New Jersey Supreme Court followed its own unique approach to collateral estoppel and perjury after acquittal, which might also
have been influenced by the earlier "absolute no bar" cases.
78. PERKINS & BoycE, supra note 4, at 522-23.
79. All the courts that have mentioned burden of proof in post-Ashe perjury after acquittal
cases have stated that the defendant has the burden of proving that the earlier acquittal already
determined the issues in the perjury prosecution in his favor. See, eg., United States v. Baugus,
761 F.2d 506, 508 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Giarratano, 622 F.2d 153, 156 n.4 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Fayer, 573 F.2d 741, 745 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Gugliaro, 501
F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1346 (2d Cir. 1974); Boyles
v. State, 647 P.2d 1113, 1117 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); DeSchepper, 304 Minn. at 410, 231 N.W.2d
at 300-01; State v. Conway, 661 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). Although these courts
did not articulate their reasoning, a common reason for allocating the burden of proof is an underlying policy determination, which here would be the anti-perjury policy. Placing the burden of
proof on a party has the effect of "loading the dice" against that party because of the view that the
issue ought to be decided against that party absent some proof to the contrary. See generally
Cleary, PresumingandPleading: An Essay on JuristicImmaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 11 (1959).
80. The burden of proof affected the decision outright only in Giarratano,622 F.2d at 156
n.4, where the court reasoned in part that the basis for the acquittal was uncertain and since the
defendant had not provided the court with the trial transcript, the defendant had failed to carry
his burden of proving that the acquittal had determined in his favor the facts which his alleged
perjury addressed.
v
81. The contrary may also be true. The tone of the opinions of several cases indicate that the
courts have tipped the balance in favor of double jeopardy acquittal interests and values. Although
not mentioning burden of proof, the cases tended to give the defendant the benefit of the doubt: (1)
by remanding where the record was incomplete, rather than ruling against the defendant; and (2)
by making assumptions in the defendant's favor. State v. Gunn, 381 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. Ct. App.
1980). See also United States v. Sarno, 596 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hernandez, 572 F.2d 218, 222 (9th Cir. 1978) (the Ninth Circuit in both cases concluded that the
original trial judges must have determined the truthfulness of defendant's testimony in granting
motions for judgments of acquittal, even though the standard of review on such motions ordinarily requires the judge to consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the government; in Hernandez, the court even criticized the Second Circuit, which
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would support an exception to collateral estoppel for perjury after acquittal
cases. This exception is discussed as an alternative approach below.
Other pre-Ashe state court cases that may have continued influence are
those which, in addition to presenting anti-pejury policy considerations,
also speculated that the verdict had been based on some point not covered
by the defendant's testimony. These cases stated in a conclusory fashion
that the jury had not necessarily found in the defendant's favor on every
issue, that the acquittal had not necessarily resolved the truthfulness of the
defendant's testimony, and that it represented only the jury's finding that
the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of proof. These courts did
not, however, effectively or meaningfully attempt to analyze what was de82
termined by the earlier acquittal.
The Ashe Court expressly rejected this type of reasoning, noting that it
effectively negated collateral estoppel altogether.8 3 Nevertheless, this preAshe approach is still used by courts that seem to apply an overly restrictive, unrealistic view of what was determined by the acquittal. Some courts
impose a hyper-technical requirement that perjury is precluded only for
false testimony about the essential legal elements of the original offense, or
the ultimate issues at the original trial, as opposed to mere "evidentiary"
matters.8 4 Other courts reason, categorically, that perjury prosecutions for
allegedly false alibi testimony are always permissible because the defendant's presence at some other particular location is never necessarily determined by the not guilty verdict.8 5 Still others simply draw a conclusory
analysis, stating without further discussion that the perjury prosecution was
has expressly placed the burden of proof on the defendant, for giving an extremely restrictive

reading of Ashe); United States v. Robinson, 418 F. Supp. 121, 125 (D. Md. 1976) (assumption
favorable to defendant about whether a certain jury instruction was given, where jury instructions
were not transcribed).
82. The rationale of these cases is unclear. The courts have followed two approaches. First,

influenced by policy considerations, some courts have applied issue preclusion standards in a narrow and conclusory manner. Second, other courts have rejected res judicata/collateral estoppel in
pejury cases by reasoning that issue preclusion standards should not apply because the first verdict can never determine the peijury issue. See, e.g., People v. Di Giacomo, 193 Cal. App. 2d 688,
14 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1961) (dicta); People v. Housman, 44 Cal. App. 2d 619, 112 P.2d 944 (1941);

People v. Hardy, 64 Colo. 499, 174 P. 1117 (1918); State v. Clinkingbeard, 296 Mo. 25, 247 S.W.
199 (1922); State v. Archuleta, 29 N.M. 25, 217 P. 619 (1928); State v. Leonard, 236 N.C. 126, 72
S.E.2d 1 (1952); State v. King, 267 N.C. 631, 148 S.E.2d 647 (1966); State v. Nierenberg, 80
N.W.2d 104 (N.D. 1956).

83. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 n.9 (quoting Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 56, at 38).
84. See, e.g., People v. Shlensky, 118 Ill. App. 3d 243, 454 N.E.2d 1103 (1983); People v.
Briddle, 84 Ill. App. 3d 523, 405 N.E.2d 1357 (1980). For further discussion of the essential
element, ultimate fact standard, see infra text and accompanying notes 112-21.

85. See, e.g., United States v. Haines, 485 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 977
(1974).
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not precluded because many issues could have been the basis for the original verdict.8 6 Several post-Ashe perjury after acquittal cases have specifically rejected this type of artificial, far-fetched analysis, 7 but the earlier,
pre-Ashe type of reasoning still seems to have some influence.
Another pre-Ashe approach that has had continued influence is the
''same or different" evidence analysis suggested by some earlier federal
cases. Unlike the pre-Ashe state court cases, the federal court perjury after
acquittal cases tended to apply current collateral estoppel standards.8 8 The
federal courts were more sensitive to the interests in the finality and sanctity
of the acquittal and the concomitant concern that the perjury prosecution
was, in effect, a reprosecution of the earlier offense.89 Several pre-Ashe federal cases seemed to protect the prosecution, however, by suggesting that
evidence indicated
perjury trials were permissible when the prosecution's
90
offense.
earlier
the
of
retrial
a
that it was not merely

86. See, eg., Baugus, 761 F.2d at 506; United States v. Gremillion, 464 F.2d 901 (5th Cir.
1972).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Sousley, 453 F. Supp. 754, 761-62 (W.D. Mo. 1978); Boyles, 647
P.2d at 1118; People v. Ward, 72 Ill. 2d 379, 382, 381 N.E.2d 256, 259-60 (1978); Commonwealth
v. Hude, 492 Pa. 600, _, 425 A.2d 313, 323 (1980).
88. See, eg., United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951); Adams v. United States, 287 F.2d
701 (5th Cir. 1961); Wheatley v. United States, 286 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1961); Ehrlich v. United
States, 145 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1944); United States v. Butler, 38 F. 498 (E.D. Mich. 1889). (Adams
and Wheatley cases essentially applied Ashe collateral estoppel standards, and have been treated as
post-Ashe cases herein). Cf. Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886) (modern estoppel concepts applied to bar relitigation in a later in rem forfeiture proceeding against defendant, of issues
resolved in defendant's favor by acquittal).
89. Thus, unlike the early state court cases that decried the anomaly of allowing a defendant
to commit two crimes without punishment and obtain immunity by defrauding the court, the
federal court that decided the earliest reported perjury after acquittal case stated:
It certainly strikes one as an anomaly that, after an acquittal for a criminal offense, a party
may be put upon trial for perjury, in swearing that he was not guilty of that offense; ... [i]f
this party could be convicted of perjury in swearing to a state of facts which a jury in
another case against him has found to be true, it would result that every criminal case in
which the defendant takes the stand and is acquitted could be practically retried upon an
indictment for perjury.
Butler, 38 F. at 498, 499-500. An interesting twist in Butler was that the alleged perjury was not
the defendant's trial testimony but his testimony "in swearing before a United States commissioner, upon his preliminary examination, that he did not so sell." Id. at 498. Thus, the former
acquittal could not have directly determined that the defendant was telling the truth when he
allegedly perjured himself. Indeed, it is not clear whether the defendant even testified at the first
trial. The former verdict determined the truth of the "state of facts" underlying the perjury
charge; it resolved in the defendant's favor the underlying factual issues (and therefore indirectly
the truth of defendant's preliminary examination testimony), so that the government was barred
from proving the falsity of the defendant's testimony.
90. See, e.g., Kuskulis v. United States, 37 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1929); Youngblood v. United
States, 266 F. 795 (8th Cir. 1920); Allen v. United States, 194 F. 664 (4th Cir. 1912) (favorably
discussing the "absolute no bar" rationale); Chitwood v. United States, 178 F. 442 (8th Cir. 1910).
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In Harris v. Washington,9 decided after Ashe, the United States
Supreme Court held that the constitutional collateral estoppel guarantee
barred relitigation despite the prosecutor's good faith in bringing the later
prosecution, and despite the relevant evidence which had been improperly
excluded at the first trial and which would be available at the second. Thus,
under the current collateral estoppel analysis, the controlling question is
whether an issue in the later perjury prosecution was determined by the
earlier acquittal, regardless of what evidence was introduced on the point
earlier and what evidence would be used later.92 Nevertheless, several postAshe cases have discussed whether the perjury prosecution was, in effect, a
reprosecution of the original charges.93 The Minnesota Supreme Court in
DeSchepper94 asserted that one of the five perjury after acquittal rules was
that a perjury prosecution is permitted when the prosecutor has evidence
which was not available to the factfinder at the first trial and which independently tends to establish that defendant committed perjury.95 The
older, pre-Ashe approach still has impact, even though rejected by the
Supreme Court. The existence of previously unavailable, after-discovered
evidence is an important element of the suggested alternative approach discussed below.
91. 404 U.S. 55 (1971), discussed supra note 70.
92. In several post-Ashe cases the existence or lack of new evidence was not significant to the
decision. Often the court did not even explicitly consider the matter. See, e.g., Baugus, 761 F.2d
506 (differences in evidence not considered); Hernandez, 572 F.2d 218 (availability of important
new evidence at perjury trial not discussed; "new evidentiary facts may not be brought forward to
obtain a different determination of the ultimate fact -... " Id. at 221 n.3 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 comment c (1982)); Myers v. State, 57 Md. App. 325, 470 A.2d
355 (1984) (rejecting prosecution's argument that, based on Harris,404 U.S. 55, the new evidence
justified the perjury prosecution); Hude, 492 Pa. 600, 425 A.2d 313 (reasoning that collateral
estoppel precludes relitigation of issues already determined regardless of whether the same or
different evidence is presented). On the other hand, mere repetition of the same evidence has not
precluded a perjury prosecution when it was not otherwise barred by collateral estoppel. See, e.g.,
United States v. Woodward, 482 F. Supp. 953, 956 (W.D. Pa. 1979) ("Ashe, however, does not
prohibit the admission of the same evidence at the second trial, but only prohibits the relitigation
of the issues conclusively decided in defendant's favor in the first prosecution.").
93. See, e.g., Sarno, 596 F.2d at 407 (unless the subsequent perjury indictment is based upon
evidence not available at the first trial, it would appear that the prosecution was merely trying to
recover from its initial failure to convince the trier of fact of the falsity of the defendant's testimony at the first trial; such rehashing of evidence previously presented would "clearly be prohibited by the collateral estoppel doctrine"); United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382, 1387 (4th Cir.
1971) (concurring opinion); Boyles, 647 P.2d at 1119 n.6 ("[A]lthough much of the evidence was
the same, there was sufficiently different testimony presented to the grand jury to convince us that
the state was not just reprosecuting Boyles on issues decided in the first trial."). Hude, 492 Pa. at
. 425 A.2d at 321-22, 327-28 (overzealous prosecutor attempting to retry the original charges).
94. 304 Minn. 399, 231 N.W.2d 294 (1975).
95. Id. at 399, 231 N.W.2d at 297 (citing Nash, 447 F.2d at 1386 (concurring opinion));
Kuskulis, 37 F.2d 241; Allen, 194 F. 664.
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E.

CollateralEstoppel Analysis in Post-Ashe Perjury
After Acquittal Cases

The Supreme Court in Ashe incorporated the collateral estoppel doctrine into the federal constitutional double jeopardy guarantee, so that the
problems of relitigating issues determined by an earlier acquittal would be
dealt with appropriately and consistently in federal and state courts.
Although the post-Ashe cases follow the same collateral estoppel principles, 96 consistency.has not been attained as the courts have not clearly and
consistently articulated and applied these principles. 97 Thus, in addition to,
and perhaps to some extent because of, the differences that seem to have
carried over from the pre-Ashe cases, the post-Ashe cases have expressed
several differently-worded standards for deciding when to permit a perjury
prosecution after acquittal. In Ashe, the Supreme Court said the appropriate inquiry was "whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict

upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from
consideration." 98 Later courts have considered (1) whether the earlier jury
"necessarily determined" in defendant's favor the issues involved in the perjury case; (2) whether a guilty verdict on perjury would necessarily contra96. In addition to the constitutionally mandated collateral estoppel requirements, several
states have collateral estoppel statutes. These statutes are largely the same as, or similar to,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.09(2) (1985), which bars prosecution after an acquittal that "necessarily
required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established for conviction of the
second offense." Id. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-107(2) (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1302(1)(b) (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, § 208(2) (1987); HAw. REV. STAT. § 701-111(2)
(1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 13-4(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3108(2)(b)
(1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 505.040(2) (Baldwin 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-10(b) (West
1982); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 18 § 110(2) (Purdon 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1 403(1)(b)(iv)
(1987-88). The comments to the MODEL PENAL CODE state that the Ashe collateral estoppel
standard "seems to be consistent with the provisions of Section 1.09(1)." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 241.1 comments at 142 (1980). In addition, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has rejected the
suggestion its statute provided less protection than the federal constitutional requirements, concluding "that 'necessarily required a determination' [in the statute] is no more restrictive than
'whether a rationaljury could have grounded its verdict' without inclusion of the issue defendant
seeks to exclude from relitigation." Commonwealth v. Hude, 492 Pa. 600, 614, 425 A.2d 313,
320-21 (1980). Other courts have simply decided cases under constitutional and statutory collateral estoppel without discussion or distinction between them. See, e.g., People v. Ward; 72 Ill. 2d
379, 381 N.E.2d 256 (1978).
97. As has been already mentioned, in State v. DeSchepper, 304 Minn. 399, 231 N.W.2d 294
(1975), the Supreme Court of Minnesota asserted that five different rules had been advocated in
perjury after acquittal cases: (1) absolute bar; (2) absolute no bar; (3) bar when perjury issues
necessarily adjudicated by acquittal; (4) bar when perjury issues probably adjudicated by acquittal; and (5) bar absent new and independent evidence of perjury, which was not available at first
trial. It should be clear from the discussion already, as well as from what follows, that these rules
do not accurately reflect the current state of the law.
98. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444.
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dict the earlier acquittal;99 (3) whether the issues in the perjury case were
crucial or material at the original trial, rather than being merely peripheral
or collateral; (4) whether the issues were issues of "ultimate fact" at the first
trial and at the perjury trial; or (5) some combination of the above.
Although these statements seem to represent significant divergence among
the courts, the differences are largely a matter of the various courts using a
variety of different phraseologies to describe what is basically an identical
inquiry. Thus, the inconsistencies seem to be largely a problem of inarticulation and loose language. Most courts apply what could be called a "necessarily determined" or "necessarily determinative" analysis, but that
analysis could certainly be set forth more precisely.
Although the post-Ashe cases quote the "rational jury" language of
Ashe, most articulate the operative standard as whether the earlier
factfinder "necessarily determined" in defendant's favor the issues involved
in the later perjury case.'°° The courts have generally applied this "necessarily determined" standard by considering whether the record of the original trial showed that the acquittal was rendered without regard to the issues

99. For cases stating that collateral estoppel requires consideration whether a guilty verdict
on the perjury charge would necessarily contradict or be inconsistent with the earlier acquittal, see
United States v. Haines, 485 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974); United
States v. Adams, 287 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Eason, 434 F. Supp. 1217 (W.D.
La. 1977); Ward, 72 II. 2d 379, 381 N.E.2d 256; Myers v. State, 57 Md. App. 325, 470 A.2d 355
(1984); DeSchepper, 304 Minn. 399, 231 N.W.2d 294; State v. McCue, 122 N.J. Super. 171, 299
A.2d 744 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973). This analysis does not really help much, however,
because to decide whether the verdicts would be contradictory or inconsistent, one must first
decide the grounds on which the first verdict was rendered and the issues determined by it. Therefore, the court must resort to the "rational jury," "necessarily determined," or some other similar
standard. Indeed, the inconsistency between the verdicts is more a reason why the perjury prosecution is barred by the acquittal, rather than a means of determining whether it is barred.
100. United States v. Giarratano, 622 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Fayer, 573
F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Gugliaro, 501 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974); Haines,485 F.2d 564;
Adams, 287 F.2d 701; Eason, 434 F. Supp. 1217; United States v. Robinson, 418 F. Supp. 121 (D.
Md. 1976); United States v. Drevetzki, 338 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Boyles v. State, 647
P.2d 1113 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); Zolun v. State, 169 Ga. App. 707, 314 S.E.2d 672 (1984);
Ward, 72 Ill. 2d 379, 381 N.E.2d 256; Myers v. State, 57 Md. App. 325, 470 A.2d 355 (1984);
McCue, 122 N.J. Super. 171, 299 A.2d 744 (alternative holding); State v. Conway, 661 P.2d 1355
(Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Hude, 492 Pa. 600, 425 A.2d 313. The United States Supreme Court
also used similar language in some of the pre-Ashe cases. See United States v. Williams, 341 U.S.
58 (1951); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948); see also United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d
1382 (4th Cir. 1971).
Some of the post-Ashe opinions also speak of deciding "what facts were or should be deemed to
have been determined," United States v. Baugus, 761 F.2d 506, 508 (8th Cir. 1985), or "what facts
were or should have been determined," Myers, 57 Md. App. at 329, 470 A.2d at 357. The significance of the additional "should" language, however, is not explained or otherwise apparent.
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involved in the perjury case; 1 ' realistically, the factfinder could have found
against the defendant on those issues and still acquitted. Thus, in addition

to the issues in the perjury prosecution, there must have been some other
issues actually litigated at the original trial. In addition, the factfinder must
have resolved these issues in defendant's favor and it must have based its
101. The Ashe Court instructed that the collateral estoppel analysis embodied in double jeopardy required consideration of all circumstances of the proceedings; an examination of the entire
record, including the pleadings, evidence, jury charge, and other relevant matters. Ashe, 397 U.S.
at 443-44. The pleadings or charging documents (complaint, indictment, information) from the
original prosecution set forth the elements of the offenses charged, and therefore, indicate some of
the potential issues at the original trial. The parties' opening statements and closing arguments
reveal the issues actually litigated and presented to the factfinder for determination. Since the
purpose of these statements is to explain the parties' theories, they should indicate their view
about what issues are determinative. Indeed, in some perjury after acquittal cases, defense counsel
argued that the jury could acquit even if it disbelieved the defendant's testimony or found against
the defendant on the points addressed by his or her testimony. See, e.g., Gugliaro,501 F.2d at 71;
Tramunti, 500 F.2d at 1347. In other cases, the prosecutor, in his summation, and throughout
the trial, made the alleged falsity of a particular part of defendant's testimony crucial and determinative, even though the point would not otherwise have been controlling. See, e.g., Robinson, 418
F. Supp. at 125-26. In a jury trial, the judge's instructions, as well as the requested points for
charge and rulings on them, also show the issues actually litigated and presented for determination, and sometimes those actually are determinative or not determinative. See, e.g., Williams,
341 U.S. at 64-65 n.4; United States v. Sarno, 596 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1979); Gugliaro, 501
F.2d at 71; Tramunti, 500 F.2d at 1347; United States v. Woodward, 482 F. Supp. 953, 956-57
(W.D. Pa. 1979); United States v. Sousley, 453 F. Supp. 754, 756, 761 (W.D. Mo. 1978); Robinson, 418 F. Supp. at 125 n.*; DeSchepper, 304 Minn. at 411-12, 231 N.W.2d at 301-02. The issues
on which the evidence was strong or weak, in light of the prosecution's burden of proof, tends to
reveal which of the litigated issues was determinative. See, e.g., Sarno, 596 F.2d at 408; Tramunti,
500 F.2d at 1347; Woodward, 482 F. Supp. at 956; Sousley, 453 F. Supp. at 761; Robinson, 418 F.
Supp. at 125-26; Boyles 647 P.2d at 1117-18; Zolun, 169 Ga. App. at 709-10, 314 S.E.2d at 674;
McCue, 122 N.J. Super. at 176, 299 A.2d at 746-47. Beyond these general record considerations,
particular decisions have relied on more special points. See, e.g., Sarno, 596 F.2d at 408 (jurors'
questions to court during deliberations); United States v. Hernandez, 572 F.2d 218, 221-22 (9th
Cir. 1978) (prosecutor's argument against motion for judgment of acquittal); Sousley, 453 F. Supp.
at 757, 762 (prosecutor's statements to grand jury that returned perjury indictment about basis for
acquittal; effect of trial court's denial of motion for judgment of acquittal after government's casein-chief, indicating government evidence, if believed, was sufficient to convict); Hude, 492 Pa. at
620, 425 A.2d at 324 (consistency of several verdicts at first trial).
When the first trial, a bench trial or otherwise, concluded with a court-ordered judgment of
acquittal, the judge ordinarily explained the reasons for the acquittal by on-the-record comments
or a written opinion. (For a discussion of "acquittals" in such cases, see supra note 54). These
explanations, which obviously do not exist when a general jury verdict is given, generally provide
significant, if not controlling, evidence of the issues that were determined by, and determinative of,
the acquittals. See, e.g., Fayer, 573 F.2d at 744 n.2, 745-47; Sarno, 596 F.2d at 407-08 (deference
granted to district court judge who ordered both the acquittal and later dismissed the perjury
charge); Giarratano,622 F.2d at 155-56; Hernandez, 572 F.2d at 221-22; Eason, 434 F. Supp. at
1220; Ward, 72 Ill. 2d at 385, 381 N.E.2d at 259-60; Myers, 57 Md. App. at 329, 470 A.2d at 35758, 361; McCue, 122 N.J. Super. at 176, 299 A.2d at 747.
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acquittal on those findings."1 2 Applied in this way, it becomes clear that the
"necessarily determined" and "rational jury" language are but two ways of
expressing the same inquiry. If the factfinder could have realistically and
rationally grounded its acquittal upon findings in the defendant's favor on
issues other than those involved in the perjury prosecution, then those issues were not "necessarily determined" by the acquittal.
Other courts have defined or applied collateral estoppel in terms of considering whether the issues involved in the perjury prosecution were "essential," "crucial," or "material," rather than merely "collateral,"
"peripheral," or "tangential" at the original trial.° 3 Although these cases
might seem to articulate a second requirement for consideration in addition

102. See, e.g., Giarratano,622 F.2d at 155-56 (original offense included three essential elements. Defendant's alleged that perjury related to one of the elements but the trial judge specifically ordered an acquittal because the government's evidence was insufficient as to other
elements); Gugliaro, 501 F.2d at 70-71 (even if jury believed defendant had been at a particular
place with an alleged co-conspirator, jury could have acquitted because the government's evidence
was weak regarding the defendant's knowledge or intent to join the conspiracy); Tramunti, 500
F.2d at 1346-47 (even if the defendant had been present at crucial luncheon and had known
alleged conspirators, prosecution's evidence of knowing, intentional participation was feeble); Adams, 287 F.2d at 703-04 (where prosecution identification evidence was questionable, the jury
could have acquitted without determining the truth of the defendant's alibi testimony that he was
elsewhere); United States v. Dipp, 581 F.2d 1323, 1326 (9th Cir. 1978) (jury could have found the
defendant was heavily involved in illegal activity with one person, the subject of perjured testimony, and still acquitted because of insufficient evidence to link the defendant to the separate
conspiracy with which he was charged); Woodward, 482 F. Supp. at 956-57 (defendant's denial of
knowledge of certain aspects of the original criminal activity could have been false, yet acquittal
rendered because government evidence was weak regarding intent to participate and other elements litigated at the original trial); Robinson, 418 F. Supp. at 125-26 (although there were other
elements that might have supported the acquittal regardless of the defendant's allegedly false testimony, the government made its whole case dependent upon the defendant's alleged lies, therefore
the jury must have acquitted based on believing the defendant); Boyles, 647 P.2d at 1117-19
(although defendant's presence on fishing grounds before certain date was discussed at original
trial, the basis of the acquittal was whether the defendant was present after that date); Zolun, 169
Ga. App. at 709-10, 314 S.E.2d at 673-74 (evidence other than an alibi could have been the basis
for the acquittal where the only witnesses who implicated defendant were seriously discredited,
and where the victim's reputation and numerous enemies indicated others who could have killed
him); McCue, 122 N.J. Super. at 175-76, 299 A.2d at 746-47 (where the trial judge found the
prosecution's evidence insufficient regarding the identity of the defendant as a participant, and
there was no determination of truth of the alibi testimony); Hude, 492 Pa. at 616-17, 620-21, 425
A.2d at 323-24, 326-27 (the only issue at the original trial was the credibility of prosecution's sole
witness, and the allegedly false testimony involved minimal points that only indirectly related to
the issues at the original trial).
103. Adams, 287 F.2d 701; Wheatley v. United States, 286 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1961); Robinson, 418 F. Supp. 121; Boyles, 647 P.2d 1113; State v. Gunn, 381 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); Ward, 72 Ill. 2d 379, 381 N.E.2d 256 (1978); McCue, 122 N.J. Super. 171, 299 A.2d 744;
Hude, 492 Pa. 600, 425 A.2d 313. The Supreme Court's pre-Ashe collateral estoppel cases, Williams, 341 U.S. 58, and Sealfon, 332 U.S. 575, also applied this analysis.
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to the "necessarily determined" analysis, 1" they really offer only different
expressions of the same basic approach. Thus, an issue has been deemed
"essential," "crucial," or "material" to the prosecution's case or to the defense at the first trial if it was determinative of the basis for the judgment of
acquittal. However, these cases have not required that the issue be essential
or material in the sense that it involve the requisite legal elements of the
offense or defense, the so-called "ultimate facts."
Another articulation of the collateral estoppel analysis is the Restatement (Second) of Judgments recommended rule of "issue preclusion" in
civil actions, which several perjury after acquittal cases have quoted.105
This rule states: "When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential
to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim." 1 6 Most
courts that have expressed this rule also follow a three-step process for collateral estoppel analysis, which may have been derived from the Restatement rule. This process involves: (1) identification of the issues in the two
cases in order to determine whether they are "sufficiently similar" and "sufficiently material;" (2) examination of the record to decide whether the issues were litigated in the first case; and (3) examination of the record to
ascertain whether the issues were necessarily decided in the first case.10 7
The bottom line inquiry under this three-step process is the same as the
"necessarily determined" analysis discussed above. Nevertheless, this type
of process would seem to be useful because a precisely articulated step-bystep analysis is clear and efficient. Also, the explicit reference to identifying
the issues in the two cases to determine whether they are sufficiently similar, if properly applied, might force the courts to broadly consider that the
issues in the perjury case are the defendant's truthfulness and the underlying substantive issues addressed by the defendant's testimony.l a'
104. See, e.g., Sealfon, 332 U.S. at 580 and Nash, 447 F.2d at 1385 (the language in these two
cases indicates there are two separate, cumulative requirements).
105. Sarno, 596 F.2d at 407-08; Dipp, 581 F.2d at 1325; Hernandez, 572 F.2d at 220; Boyles,
647 P.2d at 1116; Gunn, 381 So. 2d 1186; Conway, 661 P.2d 1355.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). The cases actually quoted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 68 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973), which was identical to the

later approved § 27.
107. This approach was first articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Hernandez, 572 F.2d at 220,
and has been followed by that court in Sarno, 596 F.2d at 408, andDipp, 581 F.2d at 1325, as well
as by two state courts (Boyles, 647 P.2d at 1116, and Hude, 492 Pa. at 612-13, 425 A.2d at 320).
108. See Hude, 492 Pa. at 618-19, 425 A.2d at 323, where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in examining the issues in the two cases for the purpose of determining whether they
were sufficiently similar (the first step of the process), noted that the ultimate issues in the two
cases (whether defendant possessed and delivered drugs and whether defendant knowingly lied)
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The Restatement "issue preclusion" rule, on the other hand, also seems
to require the same analysis as the cases applying the "necessarily determined" standard. The one significant difference in langauge is that the Restatement explicitly requires that issues actually be litigated and determined
by the earlier judgment and that such determination is "essential to the
judgment." ' 9 The perjury after acquittal cases quoting this rule do not
discuss this "essential to the judgment" requirement. Nevertheless, the official comments to the Restatement explain its purpose as limiting preclusion
to issues that were determined and determinative; that is, the judgment
must be dependent on the determination of an issue to preclude its relitigation. The concern here is that a "non-essential" determination is akin to
dictum and might not have been sufficiently well-considered to justify preclusion.1 10 The perjury after acquittal cases using the "necessarily determined" analysis, while not articulating this "essential to the judgment"
requirement as such, have effectively applied it. These cases hold that an
issue was "necessarily determined" if it was the basis for the acquittal or, in
the language of Ashe, if a "rational jury" grounded its verdict upon the
issues involved in the perjury prosecution."' Nevertheless, the Restatement's explicit articulation of this "essential to the judgment" requirement,
as separate and in addition to actual litigation and determination, would
seem to promote clarity of analysis and application over the apparent combination of these three points under the general language of the "necessarily
determined" standard. Thus, it would be clearer for the courts to articulate
a precise step-by-step analysis, like the three-step approach stated above,
but modified to expressly include the "essential to the judgment"
requirement.
All of the standards discussed so far, however expressed, basically require the same analysis of whether the issues in the perjury prosecution
were necessarily determined by and determinative of the earlier acquittal.
In contrast, a few perjury after acquittal cases seem to require that the issues must also be issues of "ultimate fact" at the original trial and, presumably, issues of "ultimate fact" in the perjury prosecution." 2 The "ultimate
facts" are the essential elements of the crimes, as opposed to mere "evidenwere different, but that the sole evidentiary issue underlying these ultimate issues was identical

(the truthfulness of the prosecution's only witness).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982), quoted supra at note 106.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment n (1982).
111. See supra text and accompanying note 102.
112. People v. Briddle, 84 Ill. App. 3d 523, 405 N.E.2d 1357 (1980); DeSchepper, 304 Minn.
399, 231 N.W.2d 294 (1975). See also Commonwealth v. Hude, 492 Pa. 600, 425 A.2d 313 (1980);
Commonwealth v. Mervin, 230 Pa. Super. 552, 326 A.2d 602 (1974); lB J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, T.
CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

0.418[2] (2d ed. 1984). Cf. People v. Buie, 126 Mich.
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tiary facts," that form the basis for deciding the "ultimate issues." This
"ultimate-evidentiary fact" distinction was traditionally part of the collateral estoppel doctrine in civil cases,' 1 3 prompted by concern about precluding relitigation of issues that were not actually determined or determinative
and, therefore, not fully considered earlier." 4 Thus, the reasons for the
distinction are satisfied by requiring that the issues be necessarily determined and determinative, and that the determination of the issues be essential to the original judgment. Because the reasons for the "ultimateevidentiary fact" distinction are treated separately, this distinction is not
included in modern collateral estoppel analysis in civil cases." 5 The distinction is not followed in most perjury after acquittal cases," 6 and it
should be explicitly rejected as the type of "technically restrictive" approach that Ashe rejects.'
An "ultimate issue" limitation is particularly problematic in perjury after acquittal cases. The truthfulness of the defendant's testimony, the "ultimate issue" inthe perjury prosecution, is generally not directly an issue in
the earlier trial. Ordinarily, the issues directly involved in the first trial
were the essential elements of the offense charged or, more precisely,
whether the prosecution proved those elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
Even when the defendant's testimony denied one or more elements or contravened the government's proof, the jury did not need to decide whether
the defendant was telling the truth. Although the defendant's testimony
might have influenced the jury or suggested a reasonable doubt, the acquittal could be based upon the jury's finding that the prosecution failed to
App. 39, 337 N.W.2d 305 (1983); People v. Longuemire, 87 Mich. App. 395, 275 N.W.2d 12
(1978).
113. In this regard, the United States Supreme Court stated:
The normal rule is that a prior judgment need be given no conclusive effect at all unless it
establishes one of the ultimate facts in issue in the subsequent proceeding. So far as merely
evidentiary or "mediate" facts are concerned, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is
inoperative.
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 338 (1957). See also The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927

(1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 comment p (1982).
114. See, e.g., Hude, 492 Pa. at 619, 425 A.2d at 323; RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF JUDG-

§ 27 comment j, reporter's note at 271-72 (1982).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment j, reporter's note at 271-72
(1982).
116. See, e.g., Hernandez, 572 F.2d 218; Sousley, 453 F. Supp. at 761-62; United States v.
Drevetzki, 338 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Hude, 492 Pa. at 619, 425 A.2d at 323, in which the
courts explicitly reject the distinction.
117. Hude, 492 Pa. at 619, 425 A.2d at 323. The Hude court and the Restatement comments
also note the difficulties distinguishing between "ultimate" and "evidentiary facts" as a reason for
MENTS

rejecting the distinction. Id at 619, 425 A.2d at 323;
§ 27 comment j, reporter's note at 271 (1982).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
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sustain its burden of proof, regardless of the truthfulness of the defendant's
testimony. In some perjury after acquittal cases, the courts have considered
the defendant's testimony to be directly an issue at the earlier trial because
the record had shown that the trial was simply a credibility contest between
the defendant and the government's witnesses,' 1 8 or because the prosecution's entire case depended upon the falsity of the defendant's testimony.' 19
In most cases, however, if the focus is too narrow,1 20 collateral estoppel
could never preclude a perjury prosecution because the initial judgment of
acquittal would not directly resolve the issue of the truthfulness of the defendant's testimony. Thus, consistent with the Ashe mandate of a realistic
and rational view of the record, the focus must be broad. The court must
consider not only whether the factfinder necessarily determined that the
defendant was telling the truth, but also whether it resolved in defendant's
favor the underlying issues addressed by the allegedly perjurous testimony.
Certainly, when the alleged perjury was testimony addressing issues resolved at the earlier trial, the same underlying issues are involved. They
simply relate to different ultimate'questions - guilt of the earlier offense
1 21
and truthfulness of the defendant's testimony.
This discussion of the collateral estoppel analysis in the post-Ashe perjury after acquittal cases demonstrates that although the applicable principles have not been clearly and consistently articulated, most of the cases
have applied the same analysis. This analysis, articulated precisely as a
step-by-step process, would require: (1) identification of the issues involved
in the original trial and in the perjury prosecution to ascertain whether they
are identical, focusing broadly on the truthfulness of defendant's testimony
at the original trial and on the issues that testimony addressed, without
distinguishing between issues of "ultimate fact" or "evidentiary fact;" and
(2) an examination of the record of the original trial to ascertain whether
realistically (a) these issues were actually litigated, presented to the
factfinder for determination, and necessarily determined by the factfinder in
rendering the acquittal, and (b) whether the determination of these issues
was essential to the judgment of acquittal. That is, were they necessarily
determinative: was the judgment dependent upon determination of them.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See, e.g., Sarno, 596 F.2d 404; Sousley, 453 F. Supp. 754.
Robinson, 418 F. Supp. at 125-26.
This narrowly focused approach is evident in some pre-Ashe cases. See supra note 82.
See, e.g., Hude, 492 Pa. 600, 425 A.2d 313, as discussed supra note 108.
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III.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO PERJURY
PROSECUTIONS AFTER ACQUITTALS

Several reasons might suggest that some other approach would more
appropriately govern the permissibility of perjury prosecutions after acquittals. Although it is possible to rationalize the post-Ashe cases to a point of
consistency, the failure of the courts to articulate clearly the applicable
standards stems, perhaps, from continued struggling with the Ashe analysis
as applied to perjury cases. Collateral estoppel may often be difficult to
apply when the earlier judgment was based upon a general jury verdict because of problems in ascertaining the basis for that verdict. Even when the
judgment of acquittal was rendered by a judge who purported to explain the
reasons for the decision, ascertaining which issues were precluded has been
difficult.
There is also continuing concern about the extent of perjury by defendants and its potentially drastic consequences for the criminal justice system.
The concerns about false testimony summarized at the outset, and controlling in many pre-Ashe cases, are not abated by the Ashe collateral estoppel
analysis. This analysis does not necessarily allow for the prosecution of
those persons whose conduct calls for strong anti-perjury policies. Indeed,
collateral estoppel permits prosecution for minimally dangerous false testimony about incidental, relatively unimportant points, but precludes prosecution for perjured testimony that actually procures or attempts to procure
acquittal by addressing essential issues. On the other hand, the collateral
estoppel approach may also be criticized for not adequately protecting important double jeopardy interests. By permitting prosecution for incidental
falsehoods, collateral estoppel effectively allows the state to do indirectly
what double jeopardy forbids it from doing directly. Although the defendant cannot be reprosecuted for the acquitted offense or for the significant
portions of his or her allegedly false testimony, the defendant can be burdened with a second prosecution for undeterminative aspects of the testimony, with the risk that,
though generally declared to be innocent, he or
22
1

she will be convicted.

122. Some other less drastic alternatives than those discussed in the text are: charging the
defendant with perjury for testimony at a proceeding other than a trial; prosecuting the defense
witnesses for perjury; and charging the defendant with subornation of perjury for procuring the
witnesses to testify falsely. These might seem viable, because they would avoid prosecuting the
defendant for perjury based on his or her own trial testimony, but only one would seem to be
effective. Although not discussed extensively in the cases, the defendant's non-trial testimony
should probably be subject to the same collateral estoppel analysis as testimony at trial. If the
testimony addressed an issue that was necessarily determined and determinative of the judgment
of acquittal, that judgment should preclude a perjury prosecution even though the testimony
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Absolute Bar of All Perjury ProsecutionsAfter Acquittals

The statutes of a few states absolutely prohibit perjury prosecutions
when the allegedly false testimony was the defendant's general denial of
guilt at another criminal trial.12 3 These statutes deal with the easiest perjury after acquittal cases-those in which the prosecution would clearly be
precluded under collateral estoppel because, whatever the basis for the acquittal, it resolved in the defendant's favor the issue of his or her guilt
which is addressed by the general denial. Although such an absolute, categorical approach would certainly be clear and easy to apply in the more
difficult and more common perjury after acquittal cases, it would give no
consideration to the substantial concerns about the consequences of false
testimony. As the Model Penal Code comments explain in rejecting this
approach, "it is reasonable, to preserve the sanction against perjury, which
is always an evil, rather than to obviate penalties for perjury in order to
prevent the mere opportunity for abuse, which conscientious prosecutors
would not exploit.""2 4 No courts or commentators have supported an absolute bar to all perjury prosecutions after acquittals.
B.

Overruling Ashe" Adopting "Same Transaction" Test for Double
Jeopardy Protection Against Successive Prosecutions

Another drastic alternative would be to change the basic double jeopardy protections so that perjury prosecutions after acquittals would not be
subject to federal constitutional limitations. This change would necessitate
overruling Ashe so that collateral estoppel would no longer be part of the
charged was not given at the earlier trial. See, e.g., In Re Bonk, 527 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1975)
(grand jury testimony); United States v. Gremillian, 464 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1972) (grand jury
testimony); United States v. Butler, 38 F. 498 (E.D. Mich. 1889) (preliminary hearing testimony).
On the other hand, defense witnesses can be prosecuted for perjury despite the defendant's acquittal, even if the factfinder found the witnesses' testimony truthful. This is because collateral estop-

pel in criminal cases only applies to protect a party defendant in the earlier case. See, e.g., Zolun
v. State, 169 Ga. App. 707, 314 S.E.2d 672 (1984); People v. Shlensky, 118 Ill. App. 3d 243, 454
N.E.2d 1103 (1983); State v. Redinger, 64 N.J. 41, 312 A.2d 129 (1973); State v. McCue, 122 N.J.

Super. 171, 299 A.2d 744 (1973). Prosecuting defense witnesses might also indirectly discourage
perjury by defendants, who might not lie themselves if they had no other defense witnesses. Ironically, even though a defense witness could be prosecuted for perjury after a judgment of acquittal
that necessarily determined the truthfulness of the witness' testimony or the issues that the testi-

mony addressed, collateral estoppel would preclude a subornation of perjury prosecution against
the defendant, because the earlier judgment would bar relitigation of those necessarily determined
matters. See Adams v. United States, 287 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1961); State v. King, 267 N.C. 631,
148 S.E.2d 647 (1966);Commonwealth v. Mervin, 230 Pa. Super. 552, 326 A.2d 602 (1974).
123. ALA. CODE § 13A-10-106 (1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-504 (1986); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 710-1066 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 523.070 (Baldwin 1984); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-8-505(2) (1987).
124. MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1 comments at 112 (1980).
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double jeopardy guarantee. It would also entail replacing the existing
"same evidence" test with a "same transaction" or "same criminal episode"
test for determining what constitutes the "same offense" within the fifth
amendment bar against successive prosecutions for the "same offense."
The reasons for this alternative include the fact that collateral estoppel
analysis does not work well in criminal cases because of the difficulty of
ascertaining what issues were determined by and determinative of a general
verdict of not guilty.12 5 In addition, collateral estoppel would seem to be an
imperfect, indirect solution to the reasons for the Ashe decision. The Ashe
Court's concern that the express double jeopardy protection against successive prosecutions for the same offense was being eroded by the proliferation
of offense categories that enabled prosecutors to charge several offenses for
essentially the same criminal activity would be more directly addressed by
adopting a "same transaction" or "same criminal episode" test.1 2 6 The
Court's current approach of using the "same evidence" test supplemented
by collateral estoppel would not seem to address the underlying double
jeopardy interests as effectively. Indeed, the Court seems to have relaxed
12 7
somewhat the narrow confines of the strict "same evidence" analysis.
Adoption of the "same transaction or episode" test has been suggested by
many commentators, and the test is used in compulsory joinder statutes in
several states.1 28 Thus, there is a substantial foundation of thought and
analysis not only to support this approach, but also to provide the practical
framework and guidance for its implementation.
Under this alternative, perjury after acquittal cases would not be subject
to double jeopardy prohibitions, because perjury and the underlying crime
are not the same offense based upon the same transaction or episode. 2 9
The underlying interests in protecting potentially innocent, acquitted defendants from the risks of vindictive prosecutions for perjury would not be
protected by double jeopardy under this alternative. With collateral estoppel no longer a federal constitutional mandate, states would be free to adopt
125. See, eg., United States v. Baugus, 761 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Giarratano, 622 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Dipp, 581 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Gugliaro, 501 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1346
(2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Adams, 287 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Woodward,
482 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Pa. 1979); United States v. Sousley, 453 F. Supp. 754, 762 (W.D. Mo.
1978); United States v. Drevetzki, 338 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Perjuryby Defendants, supra
note 2, at 763-64; Twice in Jeopardy,supra note 39, at 283-86; Recent Developments, supra note
58, at 770-71.
126. See supra notes 58-66.
127. See, eg., Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980), as discussed supra note 58.
128. See supra note 58.
129. Id.
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an approach to perjury after acquittal cases that might more appropriately
address the competing systematic and individual interests.
C. FraudException to CollateralEstoppel
Realistically, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court would so drastically
change established double jeopardy protections in the immediate future. A
less drastic alternative, more narrowly directed to perjury after acquittal
cases, would be an exception to collateral estoppel that would permit the
perjury prosecution in limited circumstances, on the ground that the earlier
judgment was procured by fraud. This would amount to a limited reversion
back to the pre-Ashe "absolute no bar" rule. Certainly, the anti-perjury
policy rationale of those earlier cases13 ° indicates the strong countervailing
considerations to the double jeopardy and collateral estoppel interests that
would support a fraud exception.
In other situations, the interests in preventing the consequences of perjured testimony have outweighed other significant individual and systematic
interests. Indeed, one scholar commented that "[p]erjury is considered so
inimical to the fair administration of justice that the detection and prosecution of perjurers has largely outweighed their rights."1 3 1 Thus, the Supreme
Court has upheld the use of cross-examination and impeachment evidence
derived from fourth amendment and fifth amendment based, Miranda v.
Arizona, violations.132 The Court has stressed "the importance of arriving
at the truth in criminal trials" as "a fundamental goal of our legal system ' and the defendant's obligation to testify truthfully.1 34 It has refused to allow defendants to pervert constitutonal guarantees into "a license
' 135
to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation"
with relevant, reliable impeaching evidence. Similarly, the Court has upheld perjury prosecutions based upon false testimony that may have been
compelled in violation of the defendant's constitutional privilege against

130. See supra notes 72-73.

131. Gershman, supra note 4, at 637.
132. As Justice Blackmun stated in his concurring opinion in Nix v. Whiteside, "the Court
has viewed a defendant's use of [perjured] testimony as so antithetical to our system of justice that
it has permitted the prosecution to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence to combat it. See,
eg., United States v. Havens, [446 U.S. 620 (1980)]; Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Walder v. United States, [347 U.S. 62 (1954)]." Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 185 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, J.J.).

133. Havens, 446 U.S. at 626.
134. Id. See also Harris,401 U.S. at 225.
135. Harris,401 U.S. at 226; see also Havens, 446 U.S. at 626; Hass, 420 U.S. at 722.
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self-incrimination."3 6 Stressing that perjured testimony is "an obvious and
flagrant affront to the basic concepts of judicial proceedings," the Court has
reiterated that "[e]ffective restraints against this type of egregious offense
137
are therefore imperative."'
There is also a generally accepted exception to finality in civil cases
when judgments are shown to have been procured by fraud, including perjured testimony and other fabricated evidence.' 38 Even in the absence of
express statutory or rule provisions, many courts have recognized an inherent power to set aside judgments obtained by fraud. 139 When procurement
by fraud is established, the judgment is no longer final and, therefore, does
not constitute res judicata or collateral estoppel."'I This "fraud" exception
is based on a balancing of interests similar to those in perjury after acquittal
cases. Finality provides a meaningful resolution of disputes that the parties
can depend on. It also relieves the parties of the expense and anxiety of
continued litigation and preserves judicial system resources. It is also accepted because the system generally yields judgments representing accurate
and just resolutions of controversies.14 1 A judgment procured by fraud,
however, clearly does not represent a just and accurate determination.
Thus, as the official comments to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments
explain:
To immunize such a judgment from attack is to compound the injustice of its result on the merits with the injustice of the means by
which it was reached. Equally important, if judgments were wholly
136. See, e.g., United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425
U.S. 564 (1976) (plurality opinion). Cf. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980) (perjury
prosecution for false testimony under immunity).
137. Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 576 (plurality opinion). See also Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 584,
609 (Brennan, I., concurring) (where the concurring justices agreed with this part of the plurality's reasoning).
138. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b); 7 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
60.24 (2d ed. 1987);RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 and comments.
139. See, 7 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.2411] and 60.33 (2d
ed. 1987); Thompson v. Crawford, 479 So. 2d 169, 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Diamond v.
State, 270 So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Lockett v. Juviler, 65 N.Y.2d 182, 186, 480
N.E.2d 378, 381, 490 N.Y.S.2d 764, 767 (1985); Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N.Y. 19, 47 N.E.2d 425,
428 (1943).
140. Only a valid, final judgment has res judicata or collateral estoppel effect. See, e.g., 1B J.
MOORE, J. LUCAS, T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE t 0.405[4.-1] (2d ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); Thompson, 479 So. 2d at 182-83.
141. See, e.g., 1B J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.405[4.-1] (2d ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 comment a (1982).
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immune it would give powerful incentive to use of fraudulent tactics
in obtaining a judgment."4 2
The civil judgment fraud exception was traditionally subject to qualifications designed to maintain the proper balance between preserving finality
and preventing injustice. 14 3 The most common of these was the distinction
between "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" fraud."4 Basically, "extrinsic" fraud
concerned matters unrelated or collateral to the merits of the controversy; it
prevented the opposing party from ever having an opportunity to litigate
the merits of the matter in court. "Intrinsic" fraud arose within the proceedings and pertained to issues that were tried or could have been tried.
Instead of depriving an opponent of a "day in court," it concerned matters
presented by the parties in court and considered in rendering the judgment.
The most common example of "intrinsic" fraud was perjurous testimony or
fabricated evidence. The reason for the distinction seems to have been that
"intrinsic" fraud could be uncovered by the parties and combatted through
cross-examination and other trial process mechanisms. Based on matters
that should have been resolved at trial, relief for "intrinsic" fraud apparently involved too much of an attack on the integrity of the trial process
and the judgment. It required examination of the underpinnings of the judgment concerning the very matters it resolved, thereby unduly jeopardizing
the interest in preventing endless litigation of the same issues.145 This reasoning is important and appropriate. It is very similar to the reasons for the

142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 comment a (1982). See also 7 J. MOORE,
J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.24[1] and 60.24[5] (2d ed. 1987); Commonwealth
v. Fiore, 341 Pa. Super. 305, 310, 491 A.2d 276, 279 (1985).
143. The official comments to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 explain these

qualifications:
Defining the circumstances under which the conclusiveness of a judgment can be overcome on account of fraud is especially difficult. The question presented by a charge of
fraud is whether a judgment that is fair on its face should be examined in its underpinnings
concerning the very matters it purports to resolve. Reexamination of those matters typically involves testimonial conflicts, often the same that were presented in the original action. Such conflicts are easy to propound and difficult to resolve with confidence. The
definitional task is therefore to state criteria that cannot so easily be met as to create open
opportunity for relitigation, but which are not so demanding that plain cases of fraud
cannot be remedied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 comment c (1982).
144. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 comments at 181; 7 J. MOORE,
J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.24[1], 60.24[5] and 60.37 (2d ed. 1987); United
States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878).
145. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 comments at 181 (1982); 7 J.
MOORE, J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
60.24[5] and 60.37 (2d ed. 1987); Thompson, 479 So. 2d at 183-84; Lockett, 65 N.Y.2d at 186, 480 N.E.2d at 381, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 767
(citing Jacobowitz v. Hevson, 268 N.Y. 130, 133-34, 197 N.E. 169, 170-71 (1935)).
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special significance and protections of acquittals under double jeopardy
and, therefore, to the reasons why the Ashe Court incorporated collateral
estoppel into double jeopardy.14 6 Although the "intrinsic-extrinsic" fraud
distinction is not followed under more modem views of the civil judgment
fraud exception,14 7 such views (like the Restatement (Second) of Judgments) do impose requirements on obtaining relief from a judgment that
relates more directly to maintaining an appropriate balance between finality
interests and preventing the evils of fraudulent behavior. 4 '
This fraud exception has also been applied in criminal cases where judgments and orders were procured by the defendants' fraud. As in civil cases,

the "intrinsic-extrinsic" distinction has been stated in criminal cases, but
has not been applied consistently.149 Recurring fact situations in which defendant's fraud has been the basis of relief for the finality of criminal judgments or orders include: (1) where the defendant fraudulently entered a
plea or otherwise procured disposition of a lesser crime to avoid prosecution
for a greater one arising out of the same transaction; prosecution for the
greater has been allowed even though the earlier disposition and judgment
would ordinarily be final;150 (2) where the defendant obtained judicial approval of a plea or other "non-trial" disposition through misrepresentation
of material facts, such as his mental condition (courts have allowed the
proceedings to be reopened); 11 and (3) where a sentence was imposed based

146. See supra notes 43-54, 65-66.
147. See, eg., FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3); 7 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.24[l], 60.37[1] (2d ed. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 comment c (1982).
148. See infra note 154.
149. See, e.g., Thompson, 479 So. 2d at 183-84; Lockett, 65 N.Y.2d at 186, 480 N.E.2d at 381,
490 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
150. See, e.g., Crayton v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. App. 3d 443, 211 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1985);
State v. Nardone, 114 R.I. 363, 334 A.2d 208, 210-11 (1975) (dicta, citing Annotation, Double
Jeopardy- Plea of Guilty, 75 A.L.R.2d 685, 691 (1961)); Lyons, 290 N.Y. 19, 47 N.E.2d 425;
Benard v. State, 481 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (dicta). Although these cases sometimes speak in terms of an exception to double jeopardy, they do not clearly apply the constitutional analysis of successive prosecutions for the "same offense." Instead, they ordinarily involve
statutes compelling joinder of offenses arising out of the same transaction or episode. See MODEL
PENAL CODE §§ 1.07(2), 1.09(1)(b) (1985).
151. See Thompson, 479 So. 2d 169 (judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity entered
without trial based on defendant's feigned insanity which, though fraudulent, was intrinsic and
not grounds for voiding the judgment); Lockett, 65 N.Y.2d 182, 480 N.E.2d 378, 490 N.Y.S.2d
764 (trial court properly vacated a plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect
based on the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentation of his mental condition). These cases recognized that double jeopardy did not bar reopening the proceedings because jeopardy had never
attached.
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on defendant's material misrepresentations. In those cases, the sentence
typically has been vacated and a more severe sentence imposed.1 52
The court in some of these cases, as well as other authorities, have suggested that a defendant's fraud constitutes a general exception to constitutional double jeopardy prohibitions. Thus, one commentator noted that
"[w]here the adjudication is secured by the fraud of the defendant, none of
the double jeopardy policies are defeated by reprosecution for the same of'
fense and it should be permitted, as it generally is." 153
However, some of
these cases are relatively antiquated, and the others are dicta, that do not
analyze specific double jeopardy prohibitions or interests.
Even without direct, well-reasoned authority, however, a fraud exception to collateral estoppel that would permit perjury prosecutions after ac152. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sole v. Rundle, 435 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1971); State v.
Carvajal, 147 Ariz. 307, 709 P.2d 1366 (1985); Commonwealth v. Bossche, 324 Pa. Super. 1, 471
A.2d 93 (1984); Commonwealth v. Fiore, 341 Pa. Super. 305, 491 A.2d 276 (1985); State v. Nardone, 114 R.I. 363, 334 A.2d 208 (1975). Although some of these courts thought double jeopardy
prohibited increasing a sentence already imposed and, therefore, spoke of the fraud as an exception to double jeopardy, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that sentence increases
are not double jeopardy violations regardless of fraud. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117
(1980). See supra note 54 for an exception to DiFrancesco.
For other criminal cases in which defendants' fraud justified setting aside orders and similar
relief, see State v. Burton, 314 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1975) (new trial order vacated and rehearing
ordered because of false statements of fact in affidavit supporting new trial motion); Diamond v.
State, 270 So. 2d 459 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (dismissal order entered in reliance on fabricated
evidence properly vacated and the defendant was required to be tried). Cf. McDaniel v. State, 604
P.2d 147 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (no double jeopardy bar to retrial after the trial judge sua
sponte declared a mistrial because the jurors had read a newspaper article containing the prosecutor's comments about the defendant's true identity as a prison escapee, where the defendant's
attempt to perpetrate fraud by concealing his true identity was the cause of the prosecutor's and
the judge's conduct).
153. Twice in Jeopardy,supra note 39, at 289-90 n.128. It is not clear that the author includes
defendant perjury as fraud; he earlier stated that reprosecution is permitted "where the verdict is
secured through fraud or collusion." Id. Also, the cases cited do not completely support the
proposition stated. The South Carolina Supreme court stated in dictum that "[a] verdict of acquittal procured by accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not put him in jeopardy;
and consequently it is no bar to a second trial for the same offense." State v. Howell, 220 S.C. 178,
189, 66 S.E.2d 701, 706 (1951). The court thereby indicated the now repudiated view that jeopardy does not attach until a valid judgment occurs. Smith v. State, 219 Miss. 741, 69 So. 2d 837
(1954), the other case cited, involved the fraudulent entry of a guilty plea to a lesser charge
brought through collusion between the defendant and complainant for the purpose of avoiding
prosecution on a more serious offense. See supra note 149.
A similar assertion about double jeopardy not barring reprosecution after an acquittal procured by fraud is made in Note, Double Jeopardy, 24 MINN. L. REv. 522 (1940) (citing, as examples, defendant's instigation of a sham proceeding to elude proper prosecution, bribery of a
prosecutor to secure acquittal, and obtaining an acquittal through perjured testimony and forged
evidence). The rationale given is akin to the pre-Ashe "absolute no bar" cases, that double jeopardy should not protect defendants who do not deserve protection, and public policy demands
that a fraudulently obtained verdict not be a shield against legitimate prosecutions.
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quittals could be established by the Supreme Court. This exception would
be supported by an analogy to the general fraud exception to finality of
judgments in civil cases and its application in both civil and criminal cases.
In addition, the strong anti-perjury policies expressed in many contexts support the exception. These policies are most forcefully seen in the early "absolute no bar" perjury after acquittal cases as well as in the several cases in
which the Court has held that perjury concerns outweighed other constitutional rights and interests. The exception would be limited by permitting a
perjury prosecution, despite an earlier acquittal, only if the prosecution established by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's testimony
was knowingly false, and that the false testimony necessarily constituted a
material basis for the acquittal. The prosecution would also be required to
establish that its clear and convincing evidence of the falsity of defendant's
testimony was new evidence, independent of the evidence at the original
trial, and not reasonably available at the original trial.154 These elements
would have to be established as a prerequisite to bringing the perjury prosecution or at the latest, shortly after its commencement.
The requirement that the prosecution prove falsity and a material basis
by clear and convincing evidence would provide an important measure of
protection for the interests in finality and sanctity of the acquittal. It would
minimize the risk of prosecutors routinely attempting, in effect, to retry
cases already decided against them. x55 This would also be consistent with
the burden of proof regarding other double jeopardy protections. The
Supreme Court stated in Arizona v. Washington,156 that although retrial is
not automatically barred after declaration of a mistrial due to events that
threaten the impartiality of the jury and the integrity of the trial process,
the prosecution has the heavy burden of justifying the retrial because of the
importance of the defendant's right to have the trial completed by the particular tribunal chosen for the task. The defendant's interests in the finality
and sanctity of the acquittal are157more significant than the interests implicated by retrial after a mistrial.
Substantial protection for the double jeopardy acquittal interests is also
provided by the additional requirement that the clear and convincing evidence be new and independent of the evidence at the original trial and not

154. These requirements would be comparable to those included in the Restatement's rule on

relief from civil judgments procured by fraud. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 70,
74 comment d, illustrations 1-4 (1982). See also 7 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE %60.37[7] (2d ed. 1987).
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 comment d (1982).
156. 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
157. See supra notes 42-55.
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reasonably available at the original trial. This requirement of "after-discovered evidence" would address the same concerns as the Restatement's recommended relief from judgment rule that calls for a reasonable effort in the
original action to ascertain the truth. 158 It would also satisfy the interests
underlying the traditional "intrinsic-extrinsic" fraud distinction, as well as
reinforce the traditional view that the trial process is the primary safeguard
against false testimony. In criminal cases this view is often subsumed
within the fundamental interests in the finality, sanctity, and integrity of a
judicial declaration of innocence.
This "after-discovered evidence" requirement should also be strict to
the extent of charging the prosecution with evidence that is reasonably
available to the police. This could pose some problems, because while the
prosecutor often must rely heavily or exclusively on the police for investigation, the prosecutor's office ordinarily has little direct authority over the
police agencies. Moreover, in less serious cases, evidence may be theoretically available, but practically unavailable. The incentive, time, and resources to discover the evidence will be commensurate with the relative
severity of the offense or offender, particularly in areas where large criminal
case loads already strain limited prosecutorial and police resources. These
practical problems should not be significant, however, because only the
most serious offenses and offenders would realistically justify the prosecution's resort to the fraud exception. Indeed, these practical considerations
would tend to enhance the protection of double jeopardy interests by further limiting the use of the exception to a very limited number of cases.
Proper definition and strict application of the requirement that the defendant's perjury be a material basis for the acquittal are also critical to a
fraud exception that appropriately balances the competing interests.
Materiality, for this purpose, should be a stricter standard than the materiality element of the crime of perjury. To satisfy that element the prosecution need only prove that the false testimony was capable of influencing
the jury, not that it actually did have influence. 159 To use the same standard as a threshold for permitting a prosecution, despite the earlier acquittal, would ignore the significant double jeopardy acquittal interests. It
would, in effect, treat an acquitted defendant like any other alleged perjurer
despite an earlier judgment that necessarily determined in the defendant's
favor the truthfulness of his or her testimony or the issues it addressed. The
purpose of a fraud exception is to permit prosecution after an acquittal procured by fraud, after the defendant's perjury has somehow caused the
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 comment d (1982).
159. See supra notes 29-31.
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factfinder to render an acquittal. Thus, the threshold materiality standard
for permitting the prosecution after acquittal must in effect require proof of
causation. The perjury would not have to be the sole basis for the factfinder
determination, but the prosecution should be required to prove that the defendant's perjury necessarily influenced the factfinder, and at least contributed or even substantially contributed to the acquittal.
This standard would be no easier to apply in cases of general jury verdicts than the collateral estoppel analysis, nor would it completely supplant
that analysis. Indeed, if a fraud exception is adopted with these requirements, there could be two levels of difficult analysis in those cases in which
the exception is invoked. The prosecution might well argue in the alternative that first, the perjury prosecution is permitted under collateral estoppel
analysis because the issues in that prosecution were not necessarily determined by and determinative of the acquittal. Second, even if collateral estoppel would ordinarily preclude the prosecution, the requirements of the
fraud exception apply to allow it. The added difficulties of this second level
of analysis would seem to be justified by the more complete and appropriate
balance struck by adding the exception.
The reasons for the fraud exception and the requirements set forth
above would arguably support an exception not only to collateral estoppel,
thereby permitting a perjury prosecution despite the acquittal, but also an
exception to the express double jeopardy protection against reprosecution
for the original offense. Nevertheless, the more limited exception is suggested because although the same interests and policies underlie both of
these double jeopardy protections, it would seem that reprosecution for the
original offense would more seriously implicate the innocence interests.
Perhaps this is only because the express prohibition against reprosecution
for the same offense has for so long been a constitutional mandate and because it more directly covers fundamental protection of innocence. In addition, the Supreme Court might be less hesitant to carve out a limited
exception, focused directly on perjury as the reason for the exception and
the remedy, than weaken the absolute, traditional, general, and express reprosecution protection.
Indeed, the biggest problem with even the narrow fraud exception to
collateral estoppel is the substantial doubt about whether the Court would
adopt it. The Court has been emphatic about the special significance and
absolute finality of acquittals. It has broadly defined the judgments accorded acquittal protection, and it has refused to consider reprosecution,
even when the acquittal had an egregiously erroneous foundation. Moreover, the Court has rejected arguments for allowing reprosecution based on
prosecutorial good faith, legal prohibitions against joining offenses in one
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trial, and new evidence that was not available at the first trial. 1 ° It is far
from clear that the Court would be persuaded to modify all these principles
to allow an exception from collateral estoppel in perjury after acquittal
cases.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Perjury prosecutions after acquittal present a clash of opposing fundamental interests and bring into sharp focus the basic interest conflict within
the criminal justice system. The general underlying criminal law interests
in crime prevention and punishment support maximum enforcement of the
perjury sanction. These interests are reinforced by particular concerns
about the drastic consequences of false testimony in the truth-determining
process, the heart of our system, and by the spectre of a defendant committing two serious crimes without criminal sanction. On the other hand, full
enforcement of the criminal law must always be tempered by the need to
protect the individual rights of each and every member of our society. The
most fundamental individual interest is protection against the conviction
and punishment of innocent persons. A judgment of acquittal, representing
a judicial declaration of innocence, is and should be final and
unimpeachable.
It is obviously impossible to completely satisfy these competing interests. The objective is to achieve an appropriate balance. In perjury after
acquittal cases, this balance has traditionally been sought through application of the collateral estoppel doctrine, which is part of the federal constitutional double jeopardy protection. Although the courts have not always
articulated and followed a clear collateral estoppel analysis, this doctrine is
ordinarily an appropriate means of allowing for enforcement of the perjury
sanction in cases where the acquittal did not resolve in defendant's favor the
truthfulness of his or her testimony or the issues such testimony addressed.
This article has shown that the constitutional collateral estoppel analysis
would be more appropriate if all courts articulated a precise step-by-step
process requiring: (1) identification of the issues involved in the original
trial and in the perjury prosecution to ascertain whether they are the same,
focusing broadly on the truthfulness of defendant's testimony at the original
trial and on the issues that this testimony addressed, without distinction
between issues of "ultimate fact" or "evidentiary fact;" and (2) examination
of the record of the original trial to ascertain whether realistically (a) those
issues were actually litigated, presented to the fact-finder for determination,

160. See supra notes 42-55, 65-66, 70.
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and necessarily determined by the fact-finder in rendering the acquittal, and
(b) the determination of those issues was essential to the judgment of acquittal, i.e., the judgment was dependent upon determination of them.
Collateral estoppel should not be the only answer, however, to the permissibility of perjury prosecutions after acquittals. In some cases the antiperjury interests outweigh the acquittal interests so that a simple finding of
what issues were determined and determinative will be inadequate to balance the competing interests. For those cases, it is recommended that the
Supreme Court recognize an exception to collateral estoppel on the theory
that the judgment of acquittal was procured by the defendant's fraud and,
therefore, the defendant is not entitled to the otherwise absolute protection
accorded the declaration of innocence. The exceptional cases that would
justify such treatment could be identified by requiring the prosecution,
either before or shortly after bringing the perjury charge, to establish: (1) by
clear and convincing evidence; (2) that the defendant's testimony was
knowingly false; (3) that the false testimony necessarily constituted a material basis for the acquittal; and (4) that its clear and convincing evidence of
the falsity of defendant's testimony was new evidence, independent of the
evidence at the original trial, and not reasonably available at the original
trial.
It may be doubted whether the Supreme Court would create this "fraud
exception" to collateral estoppel in perjury after acquittal cases. This exception is needed, however, in combination with a clearly articulated and
intelligently applied collateral estoppel analysis. This exception will strike
the most appropriate balance between interests in preventing the evils of
false testimony and in protecting the sanctity of judicial declarations of
innocence.

